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The Object Lessons series achieves something very close 
to magic: the books take ordinary—even banal—objects 
and animate them with a rich history of invention, 
political struggle, science, and popular mythology. Filled 
with fascinating details and conveyed in sharp, accessible 
prose, the books make the everyday world come to life. 
Be warned: once you’ve read a few of these, you’ll start 
walking around your house, picking up random objects, 
and musing aloud: ‘I wonder what the story is behind 
this thing?’ ”
Steven Johnson, author of Where Good Ideas 
Come From and How We Got to Now 
In 1957 the French critic and semiotician Roland 
Barthes published Mythologies, a groundbreaking series 
of essays in which he analysed the popular culture of 
his day, from laundry detergent to the face of Greta 
Garbo, professional wrestling to the Citroën DS. This 
series of short books, Object Lessons, continues the 
tradition.”
Melissa Harrison, Financial Times
Though short, at roughly 25,000 words apiece, these 
books are anything but slight.”




The joy of the series, of reading Remote Control, 
Golf Ball, Driver’s License, Drone, Silence, Glass, 
Refrigerator, Hotel, and Waste (more titles are listed as 
forthcoming) in quick succession, lies in encountering 
the various turns through which each of their authors 
has been put by his or her object. As for Benjamin, so 
for the authors of the series, the object predominates, 
sits squarely center stage, directs the action. The object 
decides the genre, the chronology, and the limits of 
the study. Accordingly, the author has to take her cue 
from the thing she chose or that chose her. The result is 
a wonderfully uneven series of books, each one a thing 
unto itself.”
Julian Yates, Los Angeles Review of Books
The Object Lessons project, edited by game theory 
legend Ian Bogost and cultural studies academic 
Christopher Schaberg, commissions short essays and 
small, beautiful books about everyday objects from 
shipping containers to toast. The Atlantic hosts a 
collection of “mini object-lessons”… More substantive 
is Bloomsbury’s collection of small, gorgeously 
designed books that delve into their subjects in much 
more depth.”
Cory Doctorow, Boing Boing
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In Ancient Crete, mythology tells us, Theseus journeyed 
deep into a labyrinth in order to slay a ferocious half-man, 
half-bull beast called the Minotaur – a bit unfair on the 
Minotaur perhaps, but fourteen young men and women 
were sacrificed to feed it as retribution for the death of 
Minos’s son Androgeos. Yet the labyrinth was said to be so 
impenetrable that even its creator, Daedalus, was scarcely 
able to escape after its construction; Daedalus was saved 
only by his foreknowledge of the maze. In the myth, Theseus 
knew the danger of this spatial arrangement for his plan and 
with the  help of a ball of thread charted his own progress 
through the labyrinth so that he might re-trace his steps, 
once the task was complete.
The labyrinth is a brilliant plot device for a myth because 
it gives a clear driver for dramatic action. The very existence 
of a labyrinth poses an irresistible navigational challenge that 
provides motive for character action within a story. Indeed, 
the basic rules of literary economy dictate that if a labyrinth 
is present, a hero must solve it. In this way, the labyrinth is the 
type of plot device that almost makes the hero; the subject-
position ‘questing hero’ is created by the  challenge of and 
response to the maze. The labyrinth is also useful for writers 
because it allows for the unambiguous sorting of individuals 
who respond to this challenge: those who can navigate the 
maze and those who cannot. Typically the hero must end 
up in the former category while there will be many indirect 
narrations of those who have failed in order to further 
legitimate the success and uniqueness of the protagonist. 
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For playful twentieth-century writers like Jorge Luis Borges, 
Alain Robbe-Grillet, or even Kate Mosse – all of whom have 
works that feature the word ‘labyrinth’ in their titles – the 
labyrinth might be posed as the ultimate mirror of literature 
itself.
Yet Daedalus’s labyrinth was nominally supposed to serve 
a single purpose within the tale: to ensure that one being – 
and only one being (Daedalus) – could ever get out. In this 
way it would contain the Minotaur and the sacrificial victims. 
The labyrinth was designed as a spatial-control mechanism 
for determining the unique identity of a single individual 
based on knowledge of its topology. In this regard, it had to 
be (and was) a failure so that Theseus could emerge as the 
hero. For everyone but Daedalus, the labyrinth was supposed 
to be, quite literally, a death trap. In the story, Theseus found 
a way to circumvent the labyrinth’s identification function 
through a cunning appreciation of the fact that the maze was 
in one sense symmetrical; the same route that lets you in can 
get you out. In this way the hero responds correctly to the 
challenge of the impossible maze: the flaws of a labyrinth as 
a means to identify individuals with cartographic knowledge 
are laid bare.
While the Theseus myth has stood the test of time and does 
much for Crete’s tourist industry, the labyrinth also looks a 
lot like something else with which we are all acquainted. 
In its planned function of identification through the proxy of 
knowledge and its implicit offer of a topological challenge to 
which a successful navigation constitutes a correct response, 
4 Password
the labyrinth resembles the special type of control system 
that we call a password. Theseus, on the other hand, is one of 
the earliest species of geek that we now would call a hacker 
or cracker.
••••_
Now consider a second story. A citizen of the United 
Kingdom sits alone at his computer, early in the twenty-
first century (but most likely late at night). His name is 
Gary McKinnon and he is obsessed by the idea that the 
US government is covering up evidence of extraterrestrial 
life. Before him on his screen is a password prompt for an 
American military computer that he is remotely accessing: 
the familiar blinking cursor. ‘••••_’. In this case, McKinnon 
does not type a password but simply hits [ENTER] because 
he knows the password is blank. In fact, he has spent weeks 
running a basic script of his own devising to trawl through 
known addresses of US military systems. This script was 
automatically looking for the instances where the careless 
security practice of empty passwords had left the lock wide 
open (surely an instance of what Tung-Hui Hu has charted 
within an alarming discourse of bad ‘digital hygiene’).1
Like Theseus, McKinnon perceived of himself as a hero of 
sorts. In McKinnon’s case, it was a belief in a quest for truth 
against the Minotaur of the US government. The challenge 
that legitimated his quest and that hailed him as a questing 
hero-subject was the message ‘PASSWORD’, the irresistible 
lure to demonstrate knowledge to prove one’s worthiness 
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and thereby gain access. Similarly, his Theseus-like moment 
of cunning was to find a way around the maze that did not 
involve knowing the pre-shared secret in advance. Indeed, 
McKinnon’s technique was simply to push at all the doors in 
the (correctly placed) hope that someone had negligently left 
some wide open.
Two different contexts, separated by a vast time period, 
but united in a common narrative: in the challenge/response 
formulation, various platforms that desire to identify 
individuals based on their knowledge also cry out to be 
defeated. Compared to McKinnon’s hacking, the labyrinth, 
then, is one of the best examples of the fact that different 
cultures in different epochs have invariably needed to identify 
friend from foe, and that this need has usually been met 
through a restriction of knowledge. Indeed, mechanisms that 
function in the same way as ‘passwords’ have existed across 
time and space, from Ancient Rome and Greece through to 
the contemporary systems of authentication with which we are 
all by now thoroughly familiar. As the labyrinth demonstrates, 
passwords have also never taken a single form (pass-‘word’ is 
actually a misnomer) and this looks set to continue to mutate 
in the future: ‘Your password is your face,’ scream Microsoft 
billboards aside London buses. Yet we rarely consider 
passwords – devices that distinguish between individuals 
based on knowledge – as anything but the obvious and natural 
way in which we might identify someone, the clear solution 
to the problem. Consider only that it is now so ingrained to 
think of passwords as verifying somebody’s identity that we 
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can say without batting an eyelid that if someone’s password is 
compromised their identity has been ‘stolen’.
But passwords are far from obvious, natural or simple. 
Passwords are complex social assemblages shaped by and 
shaping religious histories, myth, literatures of magic and 
fantasy, bodies, subjects and personhood. They offer us 
glimpses into a fundamental problem for our increasingly 
quantified age: Just what does it mean to talk about someone’s 
‘identity’?
••••_
If you needed to verify someone’s claim to be a specific 
individual, how would you go about it?
Many methods spring to mind. If you know the person 
and are face-to-face, you might rely on sight, provided you 
can see. If you cannot see, you might ask him or her to speak, 
recognizing by voice, provided you can hear. Powerful and 
wealthy entities such as governments use sophisticated 
identity cards, linked to family records uniquely available 
to the state, with supposedly tamper-proof photographic 
or biometric data. However, assuming that you lacked such 
power and wealth, or that you were at great distance from 
the person in question, or even that you did not intimately 
know the individual in advance, it is likely that you would 
arrange a system of identification based on a challenge to 
communicate pre-shared knowledge: a password.
Using a password usually consists of two components: 
issuing a challenge and receiving a response. The person 
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wishing to confirm the identity of another will ask for the 
password. The respondent is then supposed to give the 
agreed pre-shared knowledge to demonstrate his or her 
identity. Fundamentally, a correct response to a password 
challenge verifies that an individual knows a specific word or 
phrase. If it is believed that one and only one individual could 
know the password, then it is assumed that this knowledge 
identifies that person. If the password is known more broadly, 
however, then this is likely to result in a misidentification.
Passwords seem to be uncontentious. They are ubiquitous 
in our daily lives and one of the many minor inconveniences 
of technology. While many organizations are attempting to 
find better ways to authenticate users in the globalized age 
of the Internet, we generally accept that, although irritating, 
passwords are also necessary to protect us from attackers and 
to identify others across vast spaces.
Yet, passwords are far from perfect. Some systems, as we 
have already seen, can be brought down by a reel of thread. 
In fact, the basic hypothetical scenario that I outlined 
above contains within it a range of flawed assumptions.2 
The first and most basic of these is that a password might 
assist in identifying a person. In a world of high-speed 
automated cracking, it might just as well be a computer 
program attempting to convince the challenger (which 
might also be a machine) that it is actually a specific human 
or machine. A twenty-first-century robot vacuum cleaner 
might, either by trial and error or by software mapping, 
defeat the labyrinth.
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The second assumption is that there must be an additional, 
already secret and previously established channel between 
the challenger and the respondent. In other words, it is 
necessary for both parties to know the password in advance 
and for this to be communicated without compromising its 
secrecy. Regardless of the form or route it takes, then, this 
‘second channel’ implies that individuals must already be 
in communication with one another so that the secret word 
can be pre-shared. Passwords cannot identify people who are 
previously totally unknown to each other, at least via mutual 
connections. Passwords are also only useful after a time 
delay; they cannot be used before the second channel has 
secretly communicated the shared knowledge.3 Passwords 
have their own temporality.
The third assumption, in the case of people authenticating 
themselves, is that a password must be capable of being 
remembered.4 Although technological innovations such as 
‘two-factor authentication’ can harden passwords against 
attack and beyond the bounds of human recall, many 
features of passwords are limited by the capacity of memory. 
As Aeneas Tacitus put it in the Roman era, passwords should 
‘be easy to remember’.5
The fourth assumption is that a password should identify 
a singular person. Historically and in the present day, this has 
not been and is not the case. Many passwords are issued to 
groups, such as armies, submarine commanders and so on. 
This greatly increases the difficulty of keeping the password 
secret and lowers the odds of detecting a misidentification.
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The fifth assumption is that passwords might only help 
two people known to each other to verify that the correct 
individuals are present. But it is intrinsic to their nature 
that passwords can also betray. When a respondent gives an 
incorrect password to an enemy’s challenge, he or she may 
be correctly identified as an imposter; an identification that 
is certainly not of benefit to the respondent. Conversely, 
if a respondent gives the correct password to a fraudulent 
challenger, the password will be compromised (for example, 
I might pretend that I know a password and ask you to tell 
me it, thus learning the true secret by deception).
Finally, I assumed in my hypothetical scenario that when 
the password is known by more parties than it should be, 
the error in identification lies with the challenger. If I ask for 
a password and a fraudster gives me the correct response, 
I might mistakenly believe the con artist to be someone 
else. This assumption has certainly shifted in recent years. 
In order to protect themselves, various institutions in the 
late-twentieth century displaced risk away from themselves 
and on to the authentic respondent in the eventuality of 
challenger misidentification. The term now used for such a 
failure to identify a remote party based on a password system 
is ‘identity theft’. More commonly than not, there is an 
attempt to cast this as a fault on the part of the genuine user. 
This is a deeply flawed way of thinking about passwords.
These are just a few of the complexities that lie behind 
our contemporary systems of authentication. Despite the 
contrived nature of this example, however, it is also now clear 
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that from the simple premises of passwords spring many 
difficulties and flawed cultural assumptions.
••••_
This is a book about the histories, cultural contexts and 
philosophies of passwords. It is a book about how ‘what 
we know’ became ‘who we are’ or how notions of identity 
have been culturally shaped by the evolving technologies 
of the password. Passwords are crucial to our lives. They 
regulate our finances, protect our communications and 
prove who we are to others. They are powerful words. But 
from where did this equation of knowledge with a person’s 
(or a group’s) identity emerge? What does it really mean, in 
the world of passwords, to say that one’s ‘identity has been 
stolen’? What does the future of the password hold in store? 
What actually is someone’s ‘identity’? And just how do we 
define a person?
Passwords certainly have a prominent place in many 
different historical contexts. For instance, most societies 
with a military presence have used passwords to restrict 
access. This was acutely developed in Ancient Rome, where 
an elaborate system of ‘watchwords’ was deployed that shares 
many of the characteristics of contemporary passwords (most 
notably, a secure second channel). ‘Halt, who goes there?’ 
is the canonical challenge. In addition to this, passwords 
appear prominently throughout literary history, such as 
in Hamlet when Francisco challenges Bernado to ‘unfold’ 
himself, but most often in the broader form of magical 
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incantations. From the moment that Ali Baba overhears 
the magical phrase of the forty thieves – ‘open sesame’ – 
notions of secrecy and passwords are central to this well-
known tale and its supernatural elements. Likewise, in more 
contemporary writing and film, the Harry Potter heptalogy 
is emblematic of pre-shared secrets uniting to give access to 
a hidden realm, be this in the more conventional passwords 
that grant students access to their Hogwarts common rooms 
or in the three-factor authentication of ability, wand and 
magic incantation (itself a type of password) that allows the 
bearer to perform a spell.
In more recent years, the development of digital 
 cryptographic technologies and globe-spanning communi-
cation systems gave birth to the widest spread of passwords 
in human history. This stemmed from the fact that early 
computation was based on time-sharing systems in which 
there were ‘multiple terminals which were to be used by 
multiple persons but with each person having his [sic] own 
private set of files’. As Fernando Corbató, one of the designers 
of the earliest time-sharing operating systems, said, ‘Putting 
a password on for each individual user as a lock seemed like 
a very straightforward solution.’6
All of these instances of passwords, in fiction, film, 
militaries and the digital age, are like the labyrinth. They are 
all the same story of a challenge and response for knowledge 
that is supposed to identify people. Across historical periods 
the structure repeats, albeit sometimes facilitated and 
changed in form by technologies.
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Yet, despite their widespread use, hardly anyone 
writes or thinks about passwords (except perhaps for 
computer programmers). Even Corbató struggles to 
realize the histories of passwords that made his choice 
seem ‘straightforward’ and obvious when he rhetorically 
asks, ‘Surely there must be some antecedents for this 
mechanism?’ Indeed there are and they are not just 
metaphorical references to ‘locks’. But most writings about 
passwords are concerned only with pragmatic guidance 
for programmers on implementing or defeating software-
based authentication mechanisms. The need for practical 
implementations of passwords has left philosophical and 
theoretical thinking at the starting gate.
••••_
What, then, is a password? What counts? What’s in and 
what’s out? While passwords can be used to protect access 
to spaces/places (restricted areas), knowledge (restricted 
communications) and actions (such as weapon launches 
on submarines), they also adopt these forms themselves. 
For instance, a password is often knowledge of a verbal 
formulation; a pass-word in its most traditional sense. 
They can also, though, take non-verbal forms that require 
an individual to act in a specific way: pass-actions. Giving 
the Masonic handshake is a ‘password’ (a pass-action) 
demonstrating shared knowledge. Finally, and most 
contentiously, a password can be a pass-space. As per my 
opening, a labyrinth that leads to a secret area, for instance, 
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may require extensive geographical knowledge of its topology 
to be pre-shared.
As we’ve seen, a maze is not necessarily a very strong 
password because an adversary may be able to deduce the 
correct solution or find flaws in the security of the structure 
that allow the challenge to be bypassed. However, the same 
can be said of other forms of password. It was fairly easy to 
guess that my teenage brother’s password to his computer 
would pertain to Arsenal football club, about which he was 
obsessed; it was ‘Kanu25’ (a player at that time followed by his 
shirt number). This is an example of the ease of deducing the 
correct solution. If I hadn’t been able to guess the password, 
though, I might have been able to get in anyway by booting 
a different operating system from a CD ROM. This type 
of bypass of the password structure is more like Theseus’s 
hack of the maze by finding a way to work around the test, 
rather than gaining the knowledge itself. In spatial contexts, 
the fundamental question then arises, however, of whether 
or not knowledge of a secret space is itself a password. 
The  best example of this might be the hidden entrance to 
a prohibition-era speakeasy. The knowledge that one needs 
to enter is the location of the secret doorway (albeit perhaps 
with another password). Is this a password or just knowledge 
of where there is an entrance? Spaces are among the most 
difficult types of entity to classify and whether or not secret 
portals constitute discrete password systems is up for debate. 
That said, if a password system is boiled down in definition 
to shared knowledge that is supposed to limit the potential 
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identities of individuals for purposes of authentication based 
on a challenge-and-response pairing, then it seems that 
some spaces can be classed as passwords, even if they are not 
strong systems.7
As readers will surmise, then, I take a broad definition 
of ‘passwords’ based on their function. Magic incantations, 
handshakes, mazes, the body and genetic codes are all 
phenomena that exclude or admit on the basis of pre-shared 
knowledge or ownership and that all contain an implicit or 
explicit challenge to produce these artefacts. Any object that 
excludes through the proxies of knowledge or ownership 
will be called a ‘password’ here because they are functionally 
identical to true pass-‘words’. If we are considering passwords 
based on what they do, though, then it is important to seek 
the contexts in which they have most frequently appeared 
over history. After all, the uses to which passwords have 
been put are not invariant over time. However, given that so 
many passwords have been used to restrict access to military 
technologies of death, distinguishing allies from enemies, it 
is to this space that I will first turn. Speak friend and enter.




Passwords are usually conceived of as keys to the lock of 
an identification request. A password traditionally protects 
access to something of greater consequence than itself 
(a space, a piece of knowledge or ability to perform an action) 
and can feel like the weak link in a system.1 At their most basic, 
though, passwords are about shared secrets and/or exclusion 
based on identity. This notion of the ‘secret’ is crucial to a 
consideration of passwords. Without secrecy, there can be 
no need of a password. Secrecy itself rests upon concepts 
of exclusion and an inside/outside dichotomy. Those who 
know a secret are ‘in the club’, perhaps literally in the case of 
cult-like societies. Some spaces are more exclusionary than 
others, though, for a variety of reasons. Of the most secretive 
spaces throughout the history of humankind, few have been 
so restricted as militaries.
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Militaries have used passwords for a variety of purposes 
over many centuries. Contemporary facilities, where 
militaries store weaponry that it might be illegal for civilians 
to possess, are guarded by complex systems of identity 
checks. Likewise in the present day, military computer 
systems clearly rely on password-protection mechanisms 
to prevent unauthenticated and unauthorized access to 
sensitive information and actions.2 While these have evolved 
in complexity, they have been features of military life 
throughout human history. Indeed, as an immutable feature 
of military systems, passwords can broadly be categorized 
as protective objects across three different types of space: 
physical spaces, information spaces and action spaces.
Passwords, militaries and 
classical civilizations
Not every culture in human history has had a military. For 
instance, it was long uncontested that the Minoan civilization 
had no army, although the claim has come under scrutiny in 
recent years.3 Likewise, the Moriori people of the Chatham 
Islands (Rēkohu) present a well-documented example of a 
totally pacifist society, which led to their eventual genocide at 
the hands of the Maori.4 This is not to say that pacifist and non-
militaristic cultures had no uses for passwords. Particularly in 
our digital age, there are many uses to which private citizens 
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may put passwords. By contrast to these pacifist societies, 
however, we also know of cultures whose entire collective life 
and economy revolved around the military. Ancient Sparta is 
the best instance of this but claims for inclusion could also be 
extended to Britain in its period of high imperialism and the 
contemporary United States, according to critics of the so-
called military-industrial complex. In fact, at the beginning of 
the twenty-first century it would be easy to posit a correlation 
between national political systems that result in economic 
strength and the scale of that same society’s violence and 
warfare. One might even say, as does Jonathan Haas, that ‘the 
economic and demographic conditions that are conducive to 
violence are also conducive to the development of complex, 
centralized politics’.5
Secrecy, which is the core component of passwords, is key 
to, but not determining of, successful, complex, centralized 
politics but also to cultures of coordinated violence. Obviously, 
secrecy is not sufficient to make a successful, complex, 
modern political system, even if it is necessary. There are many 
secretive regimes that fare poorly by most measures of success. 
However, even though secrecy is equated with corruption in 
strong contemporary democracies – a pathology of politics to 
which the likes of WikiLeaks pose themselves as the remedy 
– it is nonetheless true that ‘modern states have not only built 
up massive, highly professional intelligence infrastructure’ 
but that ‘they also depend on espionage, secret operations, 
surveillance and the classification of information, which are 
indispensable governmental and military tools’.6
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More importantly for the discussion at hand, ‘secrets’ take 
many forms and have different connotations and degrees of 
political legitimacy over time. Two of the most prominent 
types of secret that we can derive from classical societies 
are arcana imperii and secretum.7 In ancient societies, as 
described by Aeneas Tacitus, the arcana imperii can be said 
to represent a withdrawal from knowledge. This refers to 
those moments when power deliberately takes the decision 
not to speak about events that would compromise its own 
authority. This type of secret then never has to justify itself or 
face any form of legitimation because it is unknown to those 
outside that there even is a secret. By contrast, secretum, 
which is far closer to our contemporary notions of secrecy, 
is a system of inclusion and exclusion. Under this mode, 
those who do not know the secret at least know that there is 
a secret, or they suspect it. This is a way of thinking in which 
there is a ‘relation between the known and the unknown, 
between those who suspect and those who are “supposed to 
know”’.8
Passwords can fall into both categories of secret, but the 
second, secretum, is more common. It is possible, though, 
for passwords to take the form of arcana. If a particular 
body of authority, such as a military, decides to deploy 
passwords to control access but does not make it known 
that they have such a security measure, then this would be 
arcana. It is impossible even to think to crack or guess a 
password if you don’t believe that the entity you are trying 
to defraud uses passwords. By contrast, in most cases 
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that we encounter – and because the password is now so 
ubiquitous – many passwords are secretum. By this I mean 
that everyone knows or suspects that there is a password 
that will control access to military secrets, facilities and 
systems but only the select few know what the password 
actually is or the form that it takes.
This dual nature of the secret of the password and its 
importance in military history can be traced back to Ancient 
Rome and for a historical survey of the military password 
it is to this period that I will first turn. As an example of 
arcana consider that Tacitus counsels, in his advice on siege 
defence, that one should ‘arrange in advance’ for one’s guards 
to ‘communicate by whistling’ in the event that they are 
separated, ‘for this will convey nothing to those who do not 
know it’.9 In this instance, the ‘password’ is the whistling that 
allows the identification of the individual. So far, so secretum. 
The important aspect to note, though, is that if the enemy 
does not know that this is the system of identification being 
used, they have no way of possibly impersonating those who 
do know the system. Thus, the military history of passwords 
is bound up in both arcana and secretum. In  modern 
parlance, as I will come to later, these are analogous to 
‘security by design’ and ‘security by obscurity’ respectively. 
Security by design is like secretum: everyone can know that 
there is a security mechanism and they can even know what 
it looks like and how it works. They still, though, cannot 
defeat it because knowing there is a password is useless if 
one does not know the password itself. By contrast, security 
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by obscurity is like arcana. In this mode, insufficient on 
its own, an additional layer of hardening can be applied to 
a password system by ensuring that, in conjunction with a 
secure design, outsiders do not know what the mechanism 
is or how it works.
Aeneas Tacitus’s historical military descriptions also 
show that, even in Roman times, the three core realms of 
password protection were evident: spatial, epistemological 
and practical (to do with place, knowledge and action, 
respectively). The first is the most obvious use of analogue 
password protections and pertains to the system of night 
watches that were established at Roman encampments. 
Tacitus prescribes that ‘watches at night must be strictly kept 
in time of war and when the enemy are close to the city or 
camp’ and that ‘rounds and patrols should both demand 
the password’.10 Clearly, this is a sensible precaution but 
it actually shares more in common with the problems of 
identification that I hypothetically raised at the very start 
of this volume. When identifying a soldier as friend or 
foe, it is crucial that this is done at a distance greater than 
the minimum range of that soldier’s weaponry (a concept 
thoroughly alien in the contemporary world of globalized 
and potentially nuclear warfare). After dark in Roman 
times, this created conditions of distance and lighting that 
made oral password identification the only suitable and safe 
way of verifying identity claims. In other words, as with the 
contemporary situation, the password substitutes for a lack 
of facial or vocal recognition, whether this is because the 
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parties are unknown to each other in that way or because a 
distance is imposed between the challenger and respondent, 
making this infeasible.
Tacitus also provides numerous examples of passwords 
protecting the epistemological realm (i.e. controlling access 
to knowledge) in Ancient Rome, mostly with respect to 
cryptography. Indeed, it is widely known that various figures 
in Roman times deployed cryptography, the most famous 
example being the Caesar cipher, named after the dictator of 
the Roman republic.11 What is less initially clear is the role 
that the password might play with respect to cryptography.
Cryptography is the art of encoding messages so that 
only intended recipients can read them. It is usually an 
instance of security by design, as opposed to obscurity, in 
which it doesn’t matter whether the communication can 
be intercepted, because the message remains unreadable. 
Besides the systems of asymmetric cryptography to which 
we will return, many systems of cryptography rely on the 
recipient knowing the word or phrase that has been deployed 
as a ‘key’ to the message: the password.
Ancient Roman and Greek cryptography, however, did 
not rely on passwords as keys in the same sense as we now 
conceive of them. All of the most prominent examples of 
ancient cryptography – the Caesar cipher and the Scytale 
device (a cylindrical tube that encrypts and decrypts by 
wrapping parchment around its outside) for instance – make 
use of shift or transposition ciphers, in which letters are 
either shifted by a set amount (for instance ‘a’ could become 
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In each of these cases, what should be made known to a 
desired recipient is the method by which the encryption was 
performed. Since these ciphers are symmetrical, meaning 
that the same procedure is used to decrypt the message as 
was used to encrypt it, all the recipient needs to know is how 
the sender encoded their words.
In some sense, though, knowledge of the method of 
encryption (a kind of practice) might be a type of ‘password’. 
Indeed, a restriction on knowledge of the method shares 
many of the characteristics of a password: it limits access 
based on a pre-shared system of knowledge. Restricting 
knowledge of the practice of encryption also demonstrates 
that the problem of the ‘second channel’ has been at the heart 
of password systems since time immemorial.12 If attempting 
to send a secret message in Roman times, Tacitus notes that 
it is necessary that ‘a private arrangement should be made 
beforehand between the sender and the recipient’; the 
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second channel.13 It is also clear that Tacitus’s descriptions of 
passwords are sometimes to be accompanied by non-spoken 
components that, together with the oral password, make up 
one coherent item for access: ‘A sign is sometimes employed 
as well as the password to prevent panics and for the better 
recognition of friends.’14
In one sense here, passwords that relate to cryptography 
are no different from other types of password: they give 
access to a previously inaccessible realm by verifying that 
the recipient is in possession of the pre-shared knowledge. 
It is simply that, in this case, the region to which the 
password grants access is itself epistemological (pertaining 
to knowledge) and communicative, rather than any physical 
space. From this example we can see that if the notion of 
a password in military history is extended to include non-
oral components, as it is in Tacitus’s formulation, then it is 
clear that cryptographic protection through secret methods 
(security by obscurity) is a type of password.
This is also the case with various forms of steganography 
that Tacitus lists. Steganography refers to another method 
for secreting communications, in this instance by hiding the 
message in plain sight. An example of steganography, albeit 
a weak one, is a sentence where italicized letters form the 
secret message: ‘maybe something somewhat akin to general 
writing’ (‘message’). Tacitus describes one way in which 
the ancient Roman military sent steganographic messages, 
with pre-shared knowledge of the method constituting the 
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password that would verify the reader’s permission to see the 
communication:
A book or some other document, of any size and age, 
was packed in a bundle or other baggage. In this book 
the message was written by the process of marking certain 
letters of the first line, or the second, or the third, with 
tiny dots, practically invisible to all but the man to whom 
it was sent: then, when the book reached its destination, 
the recipient transcribed the dotted letters, and placing 
together in order those in the first line, and so on with the 
second line and the rest, was able to read the message.15
In other words, it is clear that passwords take many forms, 
especially when granting access to various forms of hidden 
knowledge.
Finally, passwords can grant permission to perform 
specific actions, particularly in military contexts. In the case 
of modern warfare, film depictions have made us familiar 
with the authorization codes that submarine commanders 
request in order to launch their nuclear weapons.16 In the 
case of Tacitus’s Rome, however, an incorrect password also 
served as an authorizing device to take a specific action. 
When Athenodorus of Imbros attempted to sneak into the 
camp of Charidemus ‘they were discovered by means of the 
password’. Upon giving the incorrect (or no) password, ‘some 
were driven out, others slain at the gates’.17 In this context, 
action down two forks of a decision tree was authorized by 
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a password, depending on whether or not the word given 
was correct.
enigma: Complexity, 
calculation, making and 
breaking
Ancient Rome, along with other classical civilizations such 
as Greece, discovered the basic principles that underlie 
systems of authentication. These have not changed 
substantially even to the present day. What has changed 
over time, however, is the degree of complexity and 
calculation that is invested in securing systems of access to 
place, knowledge and action.
The best example of this link between technological 
development and warfare is the case of the Internet. As Janet 
Abbate, a prominent scholar of technology and science, puts 
it, ‘In the years since the Internet was transferred to civilian 
control, its military roots have been downplayed. … But the 
Internet was not built in response to popular demand.  … 
Rather, the project reflected the command economy of 
military procurement.’18 Leonard Kleinrock, an American 
computer scientist who worked on the early form of the 
Internet (the ‘ARPAnet’), likewise notes that ‘every time 
I wrote a proposal I had to show the relevance to the military’s 
applications’.19
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This pattern of technological development following 
military application is well established and unsurprising. 
As just one further example, NASA’s peaceful missions to 
space, for instance, are also underwritten by a distressing 
history. At the end of the Second World War, ‘Operation 
Paperclip’ was designed to bring the best Nazi scientists to 
the United States in order to further the rocket programme. 
The first head of NASA, Wernher von Braun, was one such 
scientist and there is little doubt that, had he not been 
useful, he would have been tried for war crimes relating 
to the slave labour of the V-2 project. As the old joke goes 
about NASA’s links to the V-2 via von Braun: I aim for the 
stars, but sometimes I hit London.
In the case of passwords, wartime advances in technology 
come in two forms: in the development of new approaches 
and in the breaking of known methods. At the risk of a 
large historical leap forward from the preceding section on 
Ancient Rome, one of the most well known of these periods 
of advance came during the Second World War with the 
Axis development, and subsequent Allied cracking, of the 
Enigma machine.
The Enigma machine, recently re-inscribed in the popular 
consciousness by films such as The Imitation Game [2014], 
was used by the Nazis to send encrypted messages, especially 
during the U-Boat campaigns of the Second World War. The 
machine was a distinctive step forward in cryptography for 
its use of electro-mechanical rotors, although the approach 
taken by Enigma was not itself wholly novel. Indeed, the 
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machine was based upon a fifteenth-century technique called 
a polyalphabetic substitution cipher. In a polyalphabetic 
cipher, each letter is shifted by a different amount depending 
upon the initial key. In the case of Enigma, the encryption 
key was determined by electrics and by mechanics, altering 
the substitution value on each letter-press from an initial 
setup state. This approach added an unprecedented level of 
complexity to the encoding keys (increasing the ‘keyspace 
entropy’, as it would be put in cryptography circles). 
Furthermore, the rotation of keys on a daily basis according 
to pre-defined cycles (the second channel) made it incredibly 
difficult to conduct cryptanalysis of the ciphers with any 
predictive force as it eliminated frequency analysis (the 
practice of observing that some letters, such as ‘E’, occur 
more frequently in the English language, for instance). 
Essentially, with Enigma, it did not matter whether one knew 
the mechanism; every day, the machine would generate a 
brand-new password (encryption key) that it was impossible 
to guess in any realistic timescale. Indeed, the US National 
Security Agency’s analysis of the Enigma machine states that 
there were three novemdecillion combinations of potential 
encryption passwords.20
The particular case of Enigma raises an interesting aspect 
of passwords as they are used in contemporary cryptography: 
the aim is not to make a password unbreakable but rather to 
make it infeasible to crack a password within a meaningful 
timeframe. For the Nazi submarine operation, the complexity 
needed was as long as possible, but one day was clearly 
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deemed the minimum (after which the rotors and wiring 
would be changed).
Despite what popular fiction and film would have us 
believe, Enigma was not ‘broken’ in any decisive, single 
move.21 The cracking was also not the result of any single 
nation’s or individual’s effort (although, certainly, several 
great individuals were important). Finally, the ability to 
reverse-engineer Enigma messages was not achieved through 
the development of a single cryptanalytic method. While not 
as varied as the number of combinations afforded by the 
rotor mechanisms, deciphering Enigma was a fractured and 
diverse enterprise that demonstrates a range of approaches 
by which passwords are broken.
The earliest efforts at deciphering a three-rotor Enigma 
machine were undertaken by a Polish team and in 
particular Marian Rejewski, Jerzy Rozycki and Henryk 
Zygalski. Working off a commercial version of the Engima 
machine that they had purchased and in combination with 
information provided by a German traitor, the Poles were 
able to determine the wiring and rotor configurations on 
the Nazi Enigma machines. However, this would not let 
them read the messages because the initial configurations 
remained unknown. In order to deduce the rotor settings 
quickly, the Polish group built a machine (a ‘Bomba’) that 
could rapidly test the initial positions, allowing them to 
break the early Enigma codes.
In response to this, the Germans increased the capacity 
on their Enigma machines to a five-rotor device and it is at 
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this point that the famous work of Alan Turing at Bletchley 
Park comes into the tale.22 Turing was able to modify the 
design of the Polish Bomba to conduct a known-plaintext 
attack against Enigma messages.23 In other words, Turing’s 
device could eliminate impossible rotor settings by assuming 
that messages would include known phrases such as ‘Heil 
Hitler’, ‘To’ or, in the case of the first cracked Enigma message 
on D-Day, ‘WETTERVORHERSAGEBISKAYA’ (Weather 
Forecast Biskaya).24 This was all well and good, but in the 
meantime the German navy had upgraded its stack of rotors 
to eight, from which they could select the three to be used. 
Without this knowledge, Bletchley Park could only read a 
very limited subset of messages. This headache for the Allies 
was then compounded by the addition of a fourth active rotor.
It was not until the capture of several U-Boats that the 
Allied forces, now joined by an American effort to build 
an array of high-speed Bomba-cracking devices, were able 
to modify their devices to take account of new rotors and 
the added complexity of a fourth rotor. In particular, the 
codebooks captured from U-559 were invaluable in giving 
a series of cribs against which the known-plaintext attack 
could be conducted.
This history of Enigma, presented above in an extremely 
condensed form, is well known and rehearsed. However, 
what it brings to a broader historical conception of military 
passwords is less frequently remarked upon. The introduction 
of electro-mechanical rotors into a symmetrical encryption 
process, all at a time of truly globalized warfare, began the era 
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that extends to this day, a time when only machines can decrypt 
messages encoded by the passwords of other machines. The 
ways in which passwords can be broken in this era has some 
overlap with methods used in earlier times. For instance, it 
remains true that the simplest way to recover the encoded 
text is not through cryptanalysis or brute-force attacks run on 
complex machines, but rather to attack the second channel. 
If you can force your opponent to disclose the password, or if 
you can simply gain access to the shared secret, you need not 
try to guess it via machines. In this way, as the Web comic xkcd 
recently put it, in the imagination of a cryptography enthusiast, 
an opponent will be foiled by elaborate encryption. In reality, 
the opponent will simply physically assault the person who 
knows the key and extract the password, which is far easier.25 
This might be phrased as: if at first your attempts to ask nicely 
for the password do not succeed, hit your opponents with a 
heavy object until they reveal it.
Another way of thinking about the decision of whether to 
attack the primary or secondary channel is in terms of labour 
time. The complexity introduced by electro-mechanical 
devices raised the level of requisite labour to recover the 
password beyond those achievable by humans. In the case 
of Engima, the Allied crackers then built machine tools that 
amplified their labour power to levels that could determine 
the correct password. If, however, the labour power required 
to break the second channel is less than that required to build 
such tools or to guess the primary password, then an assault 
on the second channel remains the most effective form of 
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attack. Passwords are only as strong as the weakest link, 
which in many cases are people and the second channel. Of 
course, there are usually stronger legal penalties for causing 
physical harm than for breaking into computer systems. This 
is designed to deter civilian criminals from assaulting people 
to recover passwords. In wartime, however, the situation 
is different and the state depends upon its legitimized 
monopoly on violence to attack the second channel.
Finally, the Enigma case study tells us something 
interesting about advances in password technology. At the 
start of this section I noted that progress in cryptography 
tends to occur more rapidly during wartime; whether in 
war or in peace, however, increases in complexity are often 
spurred by breakage. Put otherwise, the greatest advances 
in understandings of passwords are made not by those who 
encode messages or build systems of passwords. This group 
often believes that their systems are foolproof, uncrackable. 
It is only those who break passwords who bring the failings in 
authentication mechanisms to light. In this way, as the next 
section will explore, in the world of passwords, breaking is 
crucial to making.
Disclosure, militaries and 
the law
Let us return to one of the examples from the introduction 
to this book. In 2002, a Scottish citizen called Gary 
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McKinnon was accused by US government prosecutors 
of perpetrating the ‘biggest military computer hack of all 
time’.26 By the standards of individuals who might break 
into military computer systems, McKinnon was a relatively 
benign intruder. Exhibiting an obsession with UFOs, free-
energy-suppression conspiracy theories and supposed 
antigravity technology, the uncovering of which was his 
sole declared motivation in invading military systems, he 
was later diagnosed with Asperger’s syndrome and the 
UK government controversially blocked his extradition 
to the United States. Unlike many accomplished computer 
crackers, however, McKinnon did not gain access to the 
US military’s systems by writing exploit code that turns a 
computer program against itself. Instead, as we have already 
seen, he simply automatically scanned for blank passwords 
on US government computers. Finding their password 
system deficient, he ended up with wide-ranging access to 
a number of sensitive networks. To make an analogy with 
locks: the US military didn’t put any on its doors.
To continue this story, the US government’s response 
to the breach was swift. McKinnon was threatened with 
up to seventy years in prison under allegations that he had 
deleted key files on military servers. To some, this seemed 
reasonable. After all, if McKinnon really had crippled the 
national security systems of the United States, then this was 
something that must be deterred in future. On the other 
hand, if US military password security was really so poor, 
then should not the government be thanking its lucky stars 
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(and perhaps McKinnon) that this was brought to their 
attention, even if inadvertently? After all, seventy years is 
many, many more times the length of a prison sentence that 
would be given for a physical assault; it’s more akin to an 
espionage sentence.
The issues raised by the McKinnon incident form the 
final case study that I will here draw from military histories 
of passwords, pertaining to issues of ‘responsible disclosure’ 
and legality. By way of background, these problems have long 
been grappled with in computer-security circles. If one finds 
a vulnerability in a piece of software, how should one disclose 
it to the software's creator? One camp of security experts 
claims that security vulnerabilities should be disclosed in 
secret to the software maker. The argument here is that, in 
such cases, users will be protected because the findings will 
not be made public. This rationale does not, however, stand 
on particularly solid ground. For one, malicious adversaries 
may have independently discovered the vulnerability, in 
which case users are unaware that they are at risk. For 
another, it is unclear what incentive software companies have 
to fix software if they (erroneously) believe that a problem is 
trivial and that nobody will ever find out about the bug.
This aspect of security disclosure practices was described 
well by Bruce Schneier, a renowned authority in the field, 
who wrote:
To a software company, vulnerabilities are largely an 
externality. That is, they affect you – the user – much more 
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than they affect it. A smart vendor treats vulnerabilities 
less as a software problem, and more as a PR problem. 
So if we, the user community, want software vendors to 
patch vulnerabilities, we need to make the PR problem 
more acute.27
Schneier instead advocates for the norm to be ‘full disclosure’, 
where vulnerabilities are detailed in full, in public. This, 
obviously, exposes users to danger from attackers. The 
halfway, moderate point that most researchers use is called 
‘responsible disclosure’, where the threat of full disclosure 
is backed by an embargo period; the software developer is 
given the information privately for a limited time period in 
which they can fix the bug before the vulnerability is made 
totally public.
What has all this got to do with passwords and militaries? 
In fact, quite a lot: state militaries depend upon societal 
legitimation to hold a monopoly on violence. If militaries are 
shown to be incompetent with respect to password security, 
then the public will feel unsafe. Without public backing, 
militaries lose their legitimacy. The question then becomes 
about what we value more highly: the legitimation of our 
national militaries or true public safety.
This can be seen, albeit with some complexities, in the 
McKinnon case. McKinnon discovers a large number of 
default passwords on Internet-connected military machines. 
Clearly, this is a huge embarrassment for the military; a 
massive ‘PR problem’ as Schneier would put it. However, 
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the military also has a conflict of interest here. Of course, 
the military would like the public to think that it is entirely 
internally secure and competent, but this is clearly not the 
case. The military then has to balance two opposed logics. 
On the one hand, public safety would be increased if the 
military invited researchers to attack their password systems 
and responsibly disclose problems when found (malign 
opponents are already trying this, without the disclosure, so 
there’s less of a risk). On the other, the military’s legitimacy 
will be eroded with every disclosure as public confidence 
in its competency is diminished. In other words, military 
password systems can only embrace the strengthening 
power of breakage at the expense of their own existence and 
legitimation.
In McKinnon’s case, it is clear that the military felt extremely 
threatened by the PR disaster, which is why such lengthy 
prison sentences were proposed. McKinnon was not, strictly 
speaking, a ‘white-hat hacker’, a term that describes hackers 
whose sole aim is to disclose vulnerabilities responsibly. His 
motivation was not to disclose the information he found to 
the authorities. However, McKinnon was also hardly the 
most dangerous of felons. As the rise of information warfare 
continues, it is clear that militaries face a double bind in their 
duty to protect the public and in their mission to continue 
to exist. Where they should draw the line at prosecution is 
unclear, for while a legal deterrent seems logical, it will only 
deter those with a wish to obey the law that is stronger than 
a desire to break into military systems. Hardened criminals 
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and foreign governments hardly fit in the first category, 
while a range of individuals with the expertise to expose 
problems do.
••••_
What can we say, at the close of this chapter, about the 
philosophy of passwords that was less clear before? First, 
militaries have been core users of passwords throughout 
human civilization. Defending access to technologies of 
death remains an important use towards which passwords are 
put. There are two different types of secret that derive from 
ancient definitions into which passwords can be categorized: 
arcana and secretum. Passwords are more commonly of the 
second type, secretum. Passwords protect access to realms of 
space, knowledge and action in different contexts. Passwords 
are linked to cryptography, allowing access to knowledge in 
this field. The complexity introduced by electro-mechanical 
inventions in the twentieth century pitted machine 
against machine in the battleground for authentication 
and decryption for the first time. However, devices such 
as Enigma, and other systems of passwords in general, are 
rarely cracked in one fell swoop. Breaking passwords leads to 
the formation of stronger password systems in the dialectic 
of making and breaking, of creative destruction. Finally, 
militaries in most contemporary societies are dependent 
upon government and popular legitimation. Opening their 
password systems to the scrutiny of this making/breaking 
dialectic can lead to the decline of their support base. At the 
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same time, by closing off this valuable channel of expertise, 
they weaken their password systems and do not gain the full 
benefit of breakage.
It was not the intention of this chapter, though, to suggest 
that militaries are the sole drivers and users of passwords. 
Indeed, when we return to digital passwords in Chapter 3, it 
will become clear that civilian uses are of great importance. 
In anticipation of that discussion, however, we will now turn 
to the ways in which passwords have been represented in 
literature and religion to make clear the extent to which they 







The cultural influence of passwords can be clearly seen when 
one considers that perhaps the most important canonical 
work of English literature – William Shakespeare’s Hamlet – 
depicts authentication in the first three lines of the play. 
As the curtain rises, the night-watch guards Barnardo and 
Francisco encounter one another in the dark. Barnardo 
demands to know ‘Who’s there?’ to which Francisco responds, 
‘Nay, answer me. Stand and unfold yourself.’ Francisco’s 
counter-challenge implies his authority by saying, no, I will 
not identify myself, identify yourself, thereby flagging the 
problems of mutual identification and the potential to reveal 
passwords to unauthorized persons. Once Barnardo has 
successfully identified himself (using the less-than-cryptic 
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password, ‘Long live the king!’), their discussion can proceed 
and, conveniently, the pair actually recognize one another as 
individuals, thereby skirting the thornier problem of how 
Francisco could identify himself.
The presence of passwords in this play is, however, not 
so surprising. In one sense the password exchange between 
Barnardo and Francisco is merely another reflection of the 
military environment. After all, Shakespeare’s tragedy is set 
within the militaristic contexts of the Danish royal court and 
Elsinore castle at this point. What we are given, therefore, is an 
accurate depiction of the military use of passwords: dramatic 
mimesis. Shakespeare draws on the audience’s expectation 
of military passwords use to create a credible environment. 
Yet there is so much more to the use of passwords here 
because identity and verification, as embodied in Francisco’s 
challenge, are absolutely core to the thematic preoccupations 
of Hamlet. For one, we can see the way in which the password 
moves from arcana to secretum at the moment that Francisco 
challenges; the announcement that there is a password 
system in place. More importantly, though, the misconstrual 
of identity sits at the centre of Hamlet’s plot. It is, for instance, 
the misidentification of Polonius as Claudius that leads to 
the death of the former at the hands of Hamlet. It is also 
significant that Polonius is the spymaster of all roles, the 
character whose job is most concerned with dissembling and 
misrepresentation. Likewise, while Polonius is still living, he 
has a lengthy conversation with Hamlet in Act III, Scene II, 
about the polymorphism of the clouds, playfully suggesting 
first a camel, then a weasel, then a whale, which forms a 
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powerful metaphor for misidentification and shifting forms. 
No, the password at the opening of Hamlet is not merely a 
detail added for the sake of realism; it is a crucial device for 
the entire play. It is both first and central.
Many hundreds of thousands of words have been spilt in 
the analysis of Hamlet and I do not propose, here, to inflate 
their ranks; we would gain but a little patch of ground/That 
hath in it no profit but the name. Indeed, while Hamlet does 
give an opening into the world of passwords in literature, 
it is a very conventional type of password that appears, an 
expected rendition of military procedure, even if thematically 
core. What will be of more interest to readers, I hope, are 
the instances that follow in which I trace unusual ways in 
which passwords are used in literature, indeed ways that can 
only be accessed by works of fiction. Primarily, this realm of 
passwords that is exclusive to literature pertains to magic.
Passwords, myth and magic
In Anglo-American cultures, the most famous tales from the 
Arabian Nights, or One Thousand and One Nights as it should 
properly be called, are ‘Aladdin; or, The Wonderful Lamp’, 
‘Ali Baba and the Forty Thieves’ and the seven narratives 
pertaining to ‘Sinbad the Sailor’. As legacies of imperialism 
go, this is a fairly damning statement given that these tales 
were not Arabic originals but were actually inserted into the 
Nights by a Frenchman, Antoine Galland.1 In particular, it 
is clear that ‘Ali Baba and the Forty Thieves’ – the specific 
42 Password
tale to which I will shortly turn – was transcribed by Galland 
from a conversation in March 1709 with a Maronite scholar, 
Youhenna Diab, before Galland then interpolated the story 
into the Nights.2 In this light, we must take care, then, to 
note that inferences drawn about passwords from Ali Baba 
are perhaps more reflective of eighteenth-century imperial 
France and Europe than of first-century Islamic cultures.
This warning aside, the tale of ‘Ali Baba and the Forty 
Thieves’ presents one of the best-known instances of 
passwords in early literature. Few English speakers have not 
heard and would not comprehend the story’s central phrase, 
‘open sesame’, even if they could not pinpoint its original 
source. The tale’s narrative is familiar: Ali Baba overhears the 
password used by a gang of thieves to gain access to their secret 
den and himself enters, stealing a single bag of coins. Upon 
learning of the cave, Ali Baba’s brother, however, is greedier 
and intends to take a larger quantity of loot. Tragically, the 
brother is trapped in the cave and the thieves return and 
brutally murder him. When Ali Baba then removes the body 
for burial, the thieves are alerted to a security breach and try 
to track down the eponymous protagonist. Thanks to the 
cunning and ruthlessness of his slave girl, Morgiana, Ali Baba 
is saved from the thieves’ attempts to kill him and ends the 
tale as the sole possessor of the secret password to the cave.
Ali Baba’s tale begins, simply enough, with a classic 
representation of passwords. The thieves arrive at the 
designated place and give the ‘strange words’ that will 
identify them. When the thieves have left, Ali Baba correctly 
realizes that a system of passwords exists (now secretum, not 
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arcana) and that he may be able to fool the authentication 
system by giving the same words himself. The thieves, upon 
detecting the breach, attempt to harden their mechanism by 
killing all those who might also know the password and by 
displaying their bodies as a deterrent to others (an extreme 
form of making from breaking). Where the story differs from 
military passwords and other real-world instances is that the 
words are magical and the entrance appears out of nowhere 
in response to the incantation. It is not a human or even a 
machine demanding that others identify themselves, but 
rather a supernatural force or being that controls access.
Magic is not bound by the laws of physics and reality, of 
course. However, literary representations of magic usually 
gain credibility through an identifiable non-magical analogy. 
A good example of this need for a real-world connection can 
be seen in flying broomsticks for witches, which have been 
present in literature since at least 1489. This trope takes a 
familiar object (a broom or a stick) and, using magic, renders 
that object analogous to other forms of transport. Likewise, 
fantastic beasts are often described by their relation to other 
animals with which we are already familiar: centaurs being 
a combination of horses and humans, for example. Such 
a comparative approach is necessary because the human 
capacity for imagination, although wide, is not unbounded. 
People tend to imagine the future in metaphorical terms that 
pertain to the present, hence at the turn of the twentieth 
century the first automobiles were referred to as ‘horseless 
carriages’. The need to relate the new to the present has strong 
precedent and good writers will not introduce something 
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(either futuristic or magical) that cannot be imagined by 
analogy to a reader’s familiar reality, even if the author’s aim 
is to de-familiarize that reality.
Figure 2 A scene from Ulrich Molitor’s Von den Unholden 
und Hexan (circa 1489) showing hybrid beasts and broomsticks. 
Image out of copyright (public domain).
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This explains why the precise depiction of the password 
in Ali Baba lies somewhere between passwords as we have 
seen them so far and a new form. What we actually see here 
is a password where, as before, there is a second channel; 
the thieves know the password in advance, thereby making 
it possible for them to enter the cave. However, what is 
different is that the second channel is completely magical, 
presupposed but impossible to find or attack. We do not 
know when or how the supernatural force or being first 
communicated the password to the thieves.
Interestingly, though, Ali Baba also reveals an aspect of 
passwords and knowledge that we haven’t yet broached. 
The tale of ‘Ali Baba and the Forty Thieves’ is only possible 
because the password is an object of knowledge that can be 
transferred. The original thieves, by the end of the tale, are all 
dead but the password remains active and working. This is a 
situation involving what we might refer to as a ‘non-rivalrous 
object’ and it is one of the reasons that the term ‘intellectual 
property’ remains contentious.3 Non-rivalrous objects are 
objects that can be given to, or taken by, another without the 
original copy being lost. Non-rivalrous objects are contrasted 
with traditional material objects. If you take my keyboard, 
I will no longer have it; the object was contested for ownership 
because only one copy existed in physical space.
Knowledge and digital items are not like this. Multiple 
people may have the ‘same’ idea at the same time and it 
does not follow that the first person lost the idea. This is 
inherent in the other tale of the Nights, Aladdin, where the 
protagonist discovers the pass-action of rubbing the lamp 
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to release the genie. He was not the first or the last to have 
the idea to rub the lamp and multiple figures may know the 
secret without others relinquishing their knowledge. In this 
instance, of course, one must also have the lamp: property 
combined with knowledge. Interestingly, the concepts of 
copyright and intellectual property are designed to refashion 
artificially and limit non-rivalrous objects so that they can 
work within a rivalrous market based on material scarcity 
and money through the law. In other words, we legislate to 
treat non-rivalrous objects as though they were rivalrous so 
that they are compatible with our systems of finance (which 
are rivalrous – you can’t have my money at the same time as 
me or the entire system will break down because we will both 
spend it). In the digital space, in which perfect, instantaneous 
copying is possible, many traditionally rivalrous forms 
become non-rivalrous: music, text and images, for example.
Another fairy tale/magical password environment 
demonstrates this thinking further. In the tale of 
‘Rumpelstiltskin’, as collected by the Brothers Grimm, a 
mischievous imp helps a young girl to fulfil her father’s 
overambitious boast that she can spin straw into gold. Saving 
her life in the process, the imp-like character eventually 
demands the girl’s first-born child as payment, an element 
of her promise on which she later wishes to renege. The 
imp agrees that she may avoid her debt on condition that 
she can successfully guess his name. The imp knows that 
this is extremely unlikely as his name is ‘Rumpelstiltskin’. 
Nonetheless, the girl comes across the imp singing to himself 
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in the forest, overhears him saying his own name and, the 
next day, successfully delivers the word that will redeem her.
The tale of ‘Rumpelstiltskin’ is one of many worldwide 
variants of the so-called ‘Name of the Helper’ myth, according 
to the Aarne-Thompson classification system of folklore.4  
In fact, this pattern of tale, in which the name of an individual 
acts as the key, is utterly pervasive throughout many cultures 
and it reveals two facets of passwords that are relevant to 
the discussion here. First, there is a striving in this tale for 
the word of power to be connected directly to identity. No 
word is more personal to an individual than his or her name. 
To make this word a secret – as is also seen in other areas of 
popular culture, such as Doctor Who5 – ties a secret system of 
knowledge (passwords) to identity. Secondly, as I have been 
arguing, a name-as-password is a powerful demonstration 
of the way in which passwords are non-rivalrous forms of 
knowledge, for the tale is hugely contrived. What is the point 
of a name but to allow others to identify themselves? In using 
a name as a password and thereby keeping it secret, one is 
using a form that is supposed to be disseminated – to be 
copied and ‘owned’ by others even while the originator also 
knows it – with a totally artificial restriction.
This reveals an interesting contradiction at the heart 
of many types of passwords, namely that authentication 
mechanisms are systems of rivalrous exchange built upon 
non-rivalrous objects: passwords. This dense statement 
can be unpacked with some ease. When we design systems 
of authentication – designed to prove someone’s identity – 
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we need those systems to be exclusionary. It is absolutely 
intrinsic to their nature that they are able to distinguish, 
based on shared knowledge, whether a person or a group is 
the presumed bearer of that knowledge. For this to work the 
knowledge must be unique to the person or group; it must 
be exclusionary and rivalrous. But the system that we use, 
in many traditional circumstances, is based on knowledge, 
which is a non-rivalrous form. Many people can know the 
same thing without the original person losing the knowledge, 
although the power or capital of the knowledge may be 
degraded by its ready availability. A secret is only worth as 
much as its keepers’ discretion. However, this contradiction 
of needing falsely to economically limit a form (knowledge), 
as per the tale of Ali Baba, sits at the conflicted heart of 
passwords.
harry Potter and the two-factor 
authentication device
But magic will find a way. Indeed, if one wanted to search for 
a series of works wherein a variety of magical passwords are 
depicted that demonstrate the range and diversity of such 
systems, one could do worse than to consult J. K. Rowling’s 
Harry Potter series. Works of fantasy have long depicted 
passwords in many forms. For instance, J. R. R. Tolkien’s The 
Lord of the Rings famously presents a riddle challenge to the 
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Fellowship at the Doors of Durin – ‘Speak friend and enter’ – 
to which the correct password is ‘friend’ in Tolkien’s fictional 
Elvish language, Sindarin. Yet few works in the present day 
have given so much space to different types of password 
as Harry Potter, be it in the text’s magic incantations, the 
students’ common-room passwords, access to the Chamber 
of Secrets via parseltongue or the blood-password of the 
‘weakness payment’ to the Horcrux Cave. Some readers 
will, of course, baulk at drawing conclusions about a serious 
technological and social object, the password, from works 
of children’s fiction. On the other hand, it pays to remember 
that Rowling’s series is, as of 2015, the best-selling set of 
books of all time. If one cannot draw conclusions from 
the most widely disseminated works of contemporary 
literature – not to mention the film adaptations – then from 
where could one?
For those unfamiliar with the narrative, the Harry Potter 
series charts the adventures of the otherwise normal, young 
eponymous orphan protagonist who discovers that he has 
magical abilities. As his years of study at Hogwarts School 
of Witchcraft and Wizardry progress, the tales turn darker 
while the war with the dark wizard, Lord Voldemort, moves 
to the foreground. Unfolding over the course of seven books, 
published over a ten-year period from 1997 to 2007, and 
eight films, from 2001 to 2011, the series was the first major 
publishing success of the twenty-first century.
Passwords, even when not billed as such, are integral 
to the universe of Harry Potter. Indeed, by just the first 
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few dozen pages of the first book, Harry Potter and the 
Philosopher’s Stone, the reader has been introduced to 
three security systems that protect spaces: the entrance 
to The Leaky Cauldron, the entrance to Diagon Alley and 
the entrance to Platform 9¾ at King’s Cross Station.6 Each 
of these depends, in some way, on pre-shared knowledge 
in order to gain admittance. For instance, The Leaky 
Cauldron, a public tavern, is nearly invisible to all but the 
wizards, a group who already know of its existence. Likewise, 
the entrance to Diagon Alley, the wizards’ high-street, is 
guarded by a wall that can be opened by tapping the bricks 
in a specific order. Both of these instances of ‘password’ (or 
pass-action) are arcana; most are unaware that a secret even 
exists. Finally, for this first appraisal, though, the case of the 
entrance to Platform 9¾ is the most interesting. At this point 
in the text, Harry Potter is given instructions to board the 
train from this platform by Rubeus Hagrid. However, Hagrid 
neglects to share, in advance, the requisite knowledge (the 
‘password’) to enter the platform space and so Harry has to 
conduct a ‘side-channel attack’. While, of course, Harry is not 
unauthorized to enter the platform (i.e. the character is not 
a malicious intruder), he is unauthenticated at this time and 
adopts a similar approach to any other attacker of a password 
system. Walking around the platform, the character listens 
to the conversations of others until he hears how the system 
works, information that can then be used to his advantage.
Other instances of spatial-access-control systems abound 
throughout the Harry Potter novels. Some are extremely 
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simple and consist of spoken words to enter places, the most 
obvious examples of which are Dumbledore’s office, the 
student common rooms and the prefects’ bathroom.7 Two 
other aspects of Rowling’s world, however, gesture towards 
the fact that magical passwords in literature can circumvent 
the weaknesses of traditional passwords in reality. This is 
shown in the world of Harry Potter, where it is not always 
enough to know the password. Instead, one must actually be 
someone.
The first of these transformations towards identity and 
away from simple knowledge is seen in the entrance to the 
Chamber of Secrets in the second Harry Potter book. In this 
novel – which most strongly begins the series-long parable 
of racial prejudice – a monster is released into Hogwarts 
School to hunt down those of supposed ‘impure’ bloodlines, 
a legacy of one of the school’s founder’s racist views. The 
location whence this monster came remains unknown for 
most of the book, but it is speculated to be a mysterious 
chamber beneath the school. Finally Harry Potter finds the 
chamber and gains entrance by speaking the supposedly 
straightforward password, ‘open up’.
However, all is not quite so simple. To gain admittance to 
the Chamber of Secrets, one must say the words ‘open up’ in a 
mysterious snake-language called ‘parseltongue’. Throughout 
all of the Harry Potter books, including the canonical (but 
non-main-series) Fantastic Beasts and Where to Find Them, 
Rowling mentions only seven individuals capable of speaking 
parseltongue.8 In other words, parseltongue serves as a severe 
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restriction on who can gain entrance based on who someone 
is, not just what it is they know. This is because parseltongue 
is not, according to Rowling, like an ordinary language. In a 
2007 interview at Carnegie Hall, Rowling explicitly stated, 
‘I don’t see it [parseltongue] really as a language you can 
learn.’9 This resembles no other meaningful language on 
Earth as all languages must be acquired by speakers at some 
point in their lives. Rowling’s magical language is different, 
though. In her universe, the language parseltongue (if it 
really can be called a language) is an innate part of a person’s 
genetic (or perhaps wizarding) constitution. Harry Potter 
only possesses it because of his strange connection to Lord 
Voldemort in which they share each other’s psyches. It 
is true that Ron Weasley is able at one point to replicate a 
single syllable of parseltongue in order to himself open the 
Chamber of Secrets. For all intents and purposes, however, 
parseltongue is not about what you know, it is about who you 
are – an important shift in thinking about passwords.
It is clear, then, that works of fiction can use magic to 
move towards ‘utopian’ systems of passwords, by which 
I mean systems that do not rely on proxies of knowledge for 
identity but rather give un-mediated access to identity. For 
this is the utopian, perfect state towards which passwords 
strive: to erase themselves as intermediaries and to somehow 
purely represent personhood. We can see this utopian urge 
once more with an example from Harry Potter, indeed, the 
most fundamental of plot elements in these books: magic 
itself. To cast a spell in the world of Harry Potter – as in many 
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depictions of magic – one must know the incantation.10 
There is a secret, shared knowledge of a word that must be 
communicated beforehand (a second channel) that allows 
one to perform the action of magic: ‘stupify’, for example. But 
it is not enough to know the password in this case. As with 
the Chamber of Secrets, to cast a magic spell, one must also 
be someone: a wizard or witch.11 So far, nothing is new here. 
However, in Rowling’s universe there is a final component in 
the system that protects access to magic that relies on having 
an item as well as knowing a word and being someone: a 
magic wand.
Ostensibly, the wands in the Harry Potter series are a 
crucial component for the performance of magic. The wands 
contain, we are told, magical artefacts (‘dragon heartstrings’ 
as one example) that somehow channel the wizard’s ability. 
Yet they also clearly serve as an authentication system. Near 
to the end of the series, in a trial scene, a character is accused 
of not really being a witch but simply of having stolen a 
real witch’s wand. Likewise, a major plot element of the 
final novel centres on whether the Elder Wand can identify 
its master and properly serve the correct witch or wizard. 
Magic wands seem as though they are mere amplifiers of 
innate ability. I contend, though, that they are actually what 
we might call multi-factor authentication devices, a way of 
enhancing security by deploying multiple proxies for identity 
at the same time.
Multi-factor authentication will be explored more 
thoroughly later. What I want to close with here, however, 
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is the observation that magic and passwords seem tightly 
coupled to one another but in complex ways. Why does 
Rowling have to ensure that her witches and wizards need 
an object to limit access to magic when it is clear that one 
must already be a magical person? Objectively, she does 
not. However, by replicating systems that we now use to 
mitigate the weaknesses of passwords in her fictional realm, 
Rowling makes clear the central ethical theme of her books: 
determining people by any kind of identity, race or supposed 
inner essence is problematic and difficult. Identity categories 
are fluid and, in the racist world of Harry Potter where those 
of supposed lesser parentage are discriminated against, 
Rowling seems to be saying that we are unlikely to see radical 
change in the world until we acknowledge this. The way in 
which she chooses to complicate this identity/knowledge 
split in her works, however, is through passwords.
the Word
The final and strongest instance of ideal-state passwords 
in the Harry Potter novels, then, is the act of casting magic 
itself. More broadly, though, there is a long list of literary 
texts, religious beliefs and other cultural artefacts that tie 
the practice of magic to verbal incantations. In a way, as the 
final part of this chapter will explore, this links the ability to 
access specific practic (pertaining to action) and epistemic 
(pertaining to knowledge) spaces directly to identity.
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Perhaps the most well known of these is the Christian 
Bible’s Gospel of John, where the very first line of the very 
first verse reads, ‘In the beginning was the Word, and the 
Word was with God, and the Word was God.’ Despite the 
fact that ‘the Word’ clearly refers to Jesus (as the ‘Word of 
God’ made flesh), this has also been interpreted, by many 
commentators, as instigating a logocentric metaphysics 
in the Western world, a worldview in which the Word is 
the privileged mediator of reality (things are known and 
understood via words).12 This verse of John is significant, 
however, because it directly echoes and supplements Genesis 
1.1-3: ‘In the beginning God created the heavens and the 
earth. Now the earth was formless and empty, darkness 
was over the surface of the deep, and the Spirit of God was 
hovering over the waters. And God said, “Let there be light,” 
and there was light.’ In this mode, God is both the Word and 
uses the Word to create the world. The Word precedes the 
world and fills the formless and empty void with light and 
substance. In this tradition, God speaks the Word that is 
equivalent with himself and through this has the power to 
create the universe. This is perhaps the most powerful and 
secret piece of knowledge ever ascribed to the utterance of a 
word that is directly tied to a being’s identity, the password 
to end all passwords. It is also not surprising that it set a bad 
precedent in password practice: the first password was the 
world’s birthday.13
Other ancient cultures have different types of supernatural 
passwords that give access to power. In many of these cultures, 
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deciphering (or cracking) divine signs and passwords gives 
access to power and knowledge. Indeed, in the Akkadian 
language of Ancient Mesopotamia, the word for ‘omen’ is 
the same as ‘password’.14 This dual meaning at once causes 
an interesting overlap between interpretations of god-given 
signs and passwords, for both are systems that presuppose 
shared knowledge. To be privy to the machinations of gods, 
one must be versed in reading the omens; a second-channel 
of training in and learning of these sign-systems must be 
in place. Having access to the divine mind, clearly, bestows 
power.
For just one more instance of this phenomenon, one can 
consider the Ancient-Egyptian Book of the Dead. Geraldine 
Pinch notes, of hieroglyphs in Ancient Egypt, that ‘the 
power of the image and the power of the word are almost 
inseparable’.15 This power is clearly seen in the remarkable 
inscriptions found in the Book of the Dead that are supposed 
to guide the dead spirit safely to the afterlife. In other words, 
a series of spells are given, in advance, to the deceased, 
the knowledge of which will grant him or her access to a 
supernatural space. Of course, the spells are highly restricted 
as one must be dead for them to work. One must also have 
been of a social class with enough wealth to have a funeral 
in this style. Nonetheless, this brand of magic once more ties 
identity much more tightly to knowledge than is possible in 
a physical, as opposed to metaphysical, realm.
For this is the major shortcoming of passwords, as they 
exist in our real world: they don’t really verify who someone 
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is, they verify that the respondent knows something. Works 
of literature based on systems of magic, such as the Thousand 
and One Nights and the Harry Potter series, allow authors to 
construct a reality where these shortcomings are mitigated. 
The tale of Ali Baba shows a situation in which there is no 
original second channel and so the depiction of passwords is 
immune to second-channel attacks; the password has always 
somehow existed. At the same time, the story shows the 
weaknesses in real passwords when they are intercepted. By 
contrast, the Harry Potter books depict a series of passwords 
in their conventional form and then juxtapose these with 
more utopian, ideal systems of magical passwords that do 
not rely on the respondent’s knowledge, but instead directly 
recognize the respondent’s identity. Finally, tales such as 
‘Rumpelstiltskin’ show the way in which this striving is 
achieved. By using a name as a password, the inherent flaws 
of the distance between words and identities are revealed. 
Literary, cultural and religious interactions with magic and 
the supernatural often act to bridge the shortcomings of 
passwords, as they actually exist.
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Digital technology and the Internet have many effects on the 
contemporary world. One of the most lauded, however, is 
the perceived collapse of space and time. In the twenty-first 
century, it no longer takes weeks for a message to arrive on 
the other side of the world, even if the continued demand 
for low-cost international flights indicates that we do still 
favour in-person contact. But the digital age has changed 
not just spatial distance but also the very way that we use 
mixed metaphors of space to refer to non-physical artefacts.1 
Hypertext websites, for instance, are ‘visited’ (they are, by 
their very name, ‘sites’). Online discussion functions are 
called chat-rooms. Indeed, a plethora of spatial metaphors 
has been deployed to refer to the virtualized environments, 
forums, spaces, places, sites, rooms and home pages in the 
digital world.2 Yet, even if these digital phenomena are 
conceived of as places, they are also spaces of knowledge, 
often based upon text and reading; they are pages, e- or 
Face- books and communications. Finally, however, digital 
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environments are also places of action: we surf, scroll, click, 
enter, log in and many more. In short, the ways in which we 
linguistically frame digital technologies – and particularly 
the Internet – pertain to the three areas in ‘real-life’ that 
are protected by passwords: spaces, knowledge and action. 
It should be no surprise, then, that with the growth of the 
digital, we would see the re-application of passwords as the 
means of determining identity and controlling inclusion and 
exclusion.
As of 2016, almost the first requirement imposed upon 
any user of a modern computer system is to enter a password. 
As our lives become ever more digital, the need to restrict 
access to online resources for reasons of personal privacy 
and property is intensified. This is part of what Alan Liu has 
charted as a contemporary ‘unreal hunger for security’ that 
corresponds to an unlimited and perhaps opposed desire for 
connectedness in the information age. As we become more 
connected, our information systems by necessity become 
easier to access, both by authorized and unauthorized 
users. In fact, there cannot be an increase in connectivity 
(which is about access) without a commensurate decrease in 
security (which is about access restriction). The best security 
is to unplug the computer from the Internet. The ‘enter 
password’ screen has become, then, part of the security-
theatre apparatus that appeases our need for connectedness 
with a counterposed theology of unlimited security. ‘Enter 
password’ is the core iconography of the religion of security 
and restricted access in a world of mass inter-connectedness. 
61P455W0rD5 AnD the DiGitAL erA
This is, though, a ‘metaphysics of security’ and, for Liu, 
passwords are our ‘oaths to transcendental security’.3
However, mathematical and computer-scientific perspec-
tives on the password that were introduced in the latter part of 
the twentieth century do fundamentally change the concept 
of shared secrets.4 In the contemporary age, the  mechanisms 
involved in security have moved towards  publicly known 
processes or algorithms that produce publicly known results. 
In the present day, a respondent to a challenge must produce 
the single piece of input knowledge that will create the cor-
rect output when put through such a process, not the final 
output. This relies on the development of one-way, irreversi-
ble algorithms and a notion of asymmetry previously unseen 
in passwords: only one person knows the secret. In this 
contemporary environment, Theseus’s symmetrical thread 
attack on the labyrinth would not work. It is no longer pos-
sible to use the same route in to escape. This begins the era of 
one-way streets, the time of asymmetry.
Cryptographic hash functions
The clearest way in which to begin this exploration of digital 
asymmetry is through a description of cryptographic hash 
functions and the most simple of the problems that they 
solve for passwords. In all systems of passwords, the reader 
will recall, it is necessary that the secret knowledge of the 
password be pre-communicated to the relevant parties. In a 
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computing environment this means that the remote system 
must store a copy of a user’s password so that, when a user 
provides the secret word, the system can confirm whether or 
not it is correct. Unlike the magic scenario of Ali Baba with 
its supernatural entrance ritual, there is a determinate place 
where a computer is storing your password whenever you login 
so that it can be checked. In contrast to a human-to-human 
interaction, though, when computers store information it is 
susceptible to interception by others. After all, if the computer 
can read it, technically it might be possible for others with 
access to the computer to do likewise. This means that, if 
the password is stored in plain text, anyone who violates the 
system will have permanent knowledge of the passwords of all 
the users on that system, a far-from-desirable situation. Like 
the wizards attacked by mind readers in the world of Harry 
Potter (a ‘Legilimens’), computers are vulnerable to external 
penetration. Along with other defences, this is where systems 
of cryptographic hashing enter the equation.
A cryptographic hash function is a one-way algorithmic 
process that takes a message and produces a digest. To 
put this differently, this is a process that can take any 
piece of input text and produce output text that uniquely 
represents but is different from the input. If the process 
is run multiple times with the same input, it will generate 
the same output. It is also supposed to be impossible to 
recreate the input text (message) from the output text 
(digest); it is ‘one-way’. For instance, in the Message Digest 
5 (MD5) algorithm, the message ‘object lessons’ yields the 
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digest ‘1d67a7d36f9be2e642bd3bd3fc14071a’ every time. 
It is clear that the output bears no resemblance to the 
input. What may be less apparent is that it is supposed, 
in this algorithm, to be impossible to deduce that ‘object 
lessons’ was the input if one only knows the digest 
‘1d67a7d36f9be2e642bd3bd3fc14071a’. If I give you only the 
message digest ‘495b3e607e3eaf05d987ac81ba6cd0d5’, you 
are never going to know the embarrassing personal message 
that it contains – I hope. This is because the digest is not an 
‘encryption’ of the message but is more like a fingerprint; it 
uniquely represents, but is not equal to, in any way, the finger. 
In fact, in this algorithm, the digest does not contain all of 
the input; parts of the message are deliberately discarded so 
that it is impossible to go back to the original.
Thinking of this as a form of language reveals just how 
strangely radical a break this is. Indeed, like Parseltongue, this 
is among the most curious types of translation ever devised. 
Imagine a language that one could only translate into but 
never translate from. In this imaginary language, every time 
you translate from English (for example) it is totally clear and 
unambiguous what the translated text should look like. There 
is no room for judgement, only precision. And yet in this 
language it is impossible to translate back to English. It is 
not that we could only approximate the English equivalent 
or that we might be unsure exactly which word we should 
use; there is no possibility of recovering the corresponding 
text. This is a language and mode of translation unlike any 
other in human history and it is a very good analogy to 
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cryptographic hash functions. In another way of thinking 
about it, with reference to the mythological labyrinth with 
which I began, this is like a maze where with every step you 
take the floor behind you drops away. Or perhaps like the 
house in Mark Z. Danielewski’s extraordinary novel House of 
Leaves [2000] where the internal spatial configuration of the 
property mutates behind the explorers. The route takes you 
closer to the centre but you can’t go back.
So, how are cryptographic hashes actually used if the 
computer doesn’t know the original password? Surely 
this makes it impossible to verify whether a response to 
a password challenge is correct? The ‘language’ and its 
‘translation’ appear useless. Not so. Instead, the computer 
re-hashes the user’s input at the time of login and compares 
the hashes. Because the algorithm produces the same output 
every time and runs extremely quickly, the computer can 
simply process the user’s input and check if the hash at the 
other end is the expected result. It is true that this ‘language’ 
is useless for communication. But it turns out to be very 
useful if you want to check whether somebody knows the 
same thing at a later point in time – the very same deferred 
temporality common to all passwords.
The idea behind this method is that, even if an attacker has 
the stored hash, he or she will not know the user’s password, 
which means that if a user has the same passwords for access 
to multiple services, he or she will be safe. None of this is to 
say, however, that there aren’t attacks against cryptographic 
hash functions.
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The easiest form of attack against cryptographic hash 
functions – but not necessarily one that will succeed, for 
reasons that will shortly become apparent – is a brute-force 
attack. This consists of sequentially trying every possible 
combination of input passwords until the hash that matches 
is found. For a ten-character password, however, including 
spaces, uppercase and lowercase letters, numbers and 
special characters, there are 60,510,648,114,517,025,000 
password combinations. On a mid-range consumer PC as of 
2016, it would take about 220 thousand years to try every 
combination for the MD5 algorithm.5 This impossibly long 
timeframe is why it is a good idea to use complex passwords. 
If an attacker can be sure that the original message is a 
common word in a dictionary, he or she can simply use a list 
of words, thereby substantially reducing the time required to 
break the password.
Of course, one way in which this attack can be accelerated 
is to pre-compute all of the potential values and to store them 
in a database for speedy lookup (the process of searching is 
much faster than the operation of computing the hashes). 
In  the language/translation analogy, this would be like 
creating a dictionary for the one-way language, except that 
it’s not just a ‘dictionary’ of words, but has to be a dictionary 
of every possible set of letters in every single possible 
combination. At that point, it becomes infeasibly large.6
The second type of attack – one that is far harder to 
execute but that reveals a more fundamental flaw in the 
system of cryptographic hash functions – is a collision attack. 
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This consists of finding two input messages that generate the 
same digest. In the imaginary language scenario, this would 
be the equivalent of the English words ‘cat’ and ‘dog’ both 
translating to the same word in the imagined language. 
It  is supposed to be impossible, in a securely designed 
hash function, for this to occur. However, in reality, over 
time attackers often find ways of generating multiple input 
messages that will match an output digest, which severely 
degrades the security of such an algorithm.7 Theoretically, 
this means that an attacker could use a different password 
but still get access to your account.
Feasibility studies and designs of the first cryptographic hash 
functions did not come about until the late 1970s and, in many 
ways, they instigate a new way of thinking about shared secrets.8 
Following the post-war advent of the discipline of computer 
science and the ensuing uptake of mathematical approaches to 
cryptography and security, the assumption that now underlies 
this particular use of cryptographic hash functions is that 
the second channel is pre-compromised. In other words, the 
knowledge that is pre-shared is no longer sufficient to fool an 
identity verification system that is based around a mathematical 
operation/process in which the input cannot be derived from 
the output. My embarrassing secret message remains safe.
Fearful asymmetry
While the use of cryptographic hash functions in the 
verification of passwords is an important and useful 
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development in security, this particular use pales into 
insignificance when compared with the discovery and 
implementation of public-key cryptography, also known 
as asymmetric cryptography. Until these algorithms were 
developed, all systems of passwords were, in one sense, 
symmetric. It was necessary, in all preceding historical 
systems of passwords, for the secret to be communicated to 
all parties so that they could identify themselves or decrypt 
messages.
This outdated thinking of passwords as symmetric 
remains the way that passwords and encryption appear in 
much popular culture. In the (fairly terrible) film Swordfish 
[2001], for example, Hugh Jackman’s character Stanley 
Jobson is forced to hack into the US Department of Defense 
under a set of coercive and ‘distracting’ circumstances.9 
Despite the fact that Jobson is using code at this point, 
supposedly to circumvent the ‘enter password’ screen, the 
visual representation of this process is a typical password-
style dialogue where Jackman’s character fails on his first 
few attempts to correctly guess the access key. On the final 
attempt, he succeeds, with this plot device echoing the 
familiar experience of dread at the ATM when the third 
incorrect entrance of a PIN may mean an account lockout. 
Hacking prowess is depicted as a type of three-strikes-and-
you’re-out process wherein the pre-communicated shared 
secret must be deduced.
You will probably not be surprised to hear that these 
representations do not reflect how most systems of 
contemporary cryptography and authentication work. The 
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visual metaphor of the password remains a powerful way to 
quickly depict processes that have little to do with entering 
a secret word. In asymmetric systems there are two keys 
required to send a message. One key is made public and 
can only be used by other parties to encrypt/send messages. 
In other words, if you want to send me a secret message, 
you would encrypt your communication with my public 
key. The other key is kept secret by the person receiving the 
message and can only be used by him or her for decryption/
reading. You encrypt with my public key, I decrypt with my 
private key.
There are two interlinked ways that asymmetric encryption 
procedures can be used to verify identity, ways in which they 
become systems of passwords and ways in which they replace 
the type of authentication seen in films such a Swordfish. 
The first is via a simple message relay. If I send a message 
to Alice, encrypted with her public key, that says ‘hello’, and 
Figure 3 An asymmetric encryption and decryption process.
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the person claiming to be Alice can tell me what the message 
said (because she possesses the private key), then I can be 
certain that I have got the right person.10 Except, as with all 
systems of passwords, that certainty is slightly misplaced and 
confuses the map with the territory, the proxy with identity. 
Assuming the integrity of the asymmetric algorithm holds, 
what I have really proved is that the person to whom I sent 
the message has access to the corresponding secret key that 
will decode the message. In this instance, the proxy is not 
conceived of as knowing something (since private keys are 
too long to remember) but having something. This no more 
proves that somebody is someone than any other form of 
password.
The second way in which asymmetric encryption can 
be used to prove identity arose in response to this problem: 
the idea of ‘certificate authorities’. Certificate authorities are 
third-party mediating entities deemed to be ‘trusted’ by a 
large community. The role of a certificate authority is to attest 
that a public key belongs to a specifically named subject. This 
is designed to get around the problem specified above: that 
asymmetric cryptographic techniques prove possession, 
not identity. With the addition of a certificate authority, a 
trusted third party asserts that there is equivalence between 
possession and identity.
There is, though, something interesting going on around 
the discourse of trust and identity here. One of the ideas of 
public-key cryptography is that it might foster greater trust 
through transparency and through third parties vouching 
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for others. In a culture of total transparency and openness, 
it has been argued, there will be more trust.11 But this relies 
on a curious logic. In a culture of trust, there is no need for 
transparency. If I trust my spouse, I will not demand an 
itinerary of her, like some jealous lover. By contrast, it is in 
cultures underpinned by suspicion, conspiracy and paranoia 
that these demands for transparency come in. It is wrong-
headed to think that by demanding that public-key certificates 
be openly presented and that certificate authorities attest to 
their validity that we have created trust. If we did not distrust, 
if we had no belief that there was malice ‘out there’, we would 
have no need of such systems.
Public-key cryptography, then, which thrives in a culture 
of paranoia and distrust, has nonetheless proved remarkably 
resilient to attack. The mathematical logic on which most 
asymmetric systems rest is that it is computationally infeasible 
to prime-factor large numbers and no trivial algorithmic 
process exists for such a process. (And I mean here really 
large numbers, over one hundred digits in length.) So long 
as this remains true, asymmetric encryption techniques 
will persist. However, like any other system of passwords, 
encryption or security, asymmetric cryptography is only as 
secure as the weakest component that protects it.
In reality, there have been several instances where 
certificate authorities have been hacked, although none, 
so far as I am aware, by Hugh Jackman or John Travolta.12 
In this type of incident, the third party can no longer be 
trusted and may falsely assert that a key belongs to an 
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individual. Because the assumption is that the certificate 
authority proves that an individual is a specific person if he 
or she is in possession of a key, if the certificate authority 
is compromised and this remains unknown to me, I might 
give restricted information, the right to perform restricted 
actions, or access to restricted spaces to a fraudulent attacker. 
Certificate authorities are, therefore, a problematic weak link 
for asymmetric encryption keys.
Likewise, the private key file must be stored on a computer 
as it is too long for a user to remember. This presents an 
additional attack surface. If an attacker can find another 
way to compromise the machine on which the private key 
is stored – such as a social engineering attack where one 
might pose as an IT engineer in order to obtain the user’s 
regular password fraudulently – then the system of ‘trust’ 
is also silently compromised. Some mitigation against this 
particular attack (compromise of the private key) is offered 
by encrypting the file with a password. In one sense this is 
a form of multi-factor authentication; it requires the user 
to ‘have’ something (the private key file) as well as to know 
something (the password to it). In another, though, this is 
only a quasi-multi-factor system. This hinges upon the fact 
that digital ‘ownership’ is not identical to property.
Although, above, I noted that the asymmetric key system 
looks like a shift from knowledge to ownership, it’s actually 
slightly more complex than that. The security of many 
asymmetric key-based authentication systems is, in fact, 
dependent upon a somewhat flawed conception of unique 
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digital knowledge as analogous to physical property. Private 
key files, which can be ‘stolen’, are protected by passwords 
even as they are, themselves, a form of password. This isn’t 
true multi-factor authentication, though, because one 
doesn’t ‘own’ the private key file (it is a non-rivalrous digital 
object that can be copied ad infinitum even while the premise 
of secrecy rests on exclusive access). Unlike ownership, it is 
more appropriate to say that one ‘knows’ the private key file, 
having delegated the remembrance of a complex and long 
number to a computational device. The actual security of such 
a system, then, depends upon hardening a digital memory 
against external penetration.13 This is a bit like property – it 
depends on protecting exclusive access – but the object of 
protection is actually more akin to knowledge. The metaphor 
in computing that consists of referring to volatile and non-
volatile storage media as ‘memory’ is, therefore, extremely 
apt but far from perfect.
This type of thinking brings us back full circle to where 
I  began this chapter. The difficulty in thinking about 
immaterial objects – like passwords and keys – through a 
language that has grown with notions of ownership most 
suited to rivalrous physical property (spaces, places, rooms, 
sites) has implications for passwords. You may own the 
storage media (hard disks, DVDs, etc.) on which a password 
or asymmetric key resides but does that mean you own the 
key itself? What does it mean to say that you ‘own’ an ‘object’ 
that can be copied indefinitely with total fidelity? A couple 
of examples from copyright law will better illustrate the 
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difficulty. First, consider the case of a photograph that one has 
recently taken. This is probably a copyrightable expression 
and so you have the right of ownership under law. Even if 
you display this photograph publicly and allow thousands 
of people access to see it, online or physically, and regardless 
of how many copies exist, you still have a legal right that is 
analogous to ‘ownership’ of the photograph. By contrast, let 
us say that you have owned a photograph for the entire term 
of copyright (for argument’s sake, it was once published but 
is now impossible to find due to obscurity and destruction 
of the original publication). Once the copyright has expired, 
you will have no legal right of ownership over reproductions 
of the photograph but you will still have access to the only 
version, meaning that nobody else can make a copy. This 
phenomenon, whereby two types of ownership – physical 
ownership and legal ownership of an item that can easily be 
copied indefinitely – overlap, is exactly the same for the type 
of security surrounding asymmetric encryption keys. You can 
try to protect physical access to the media on which the key is 
stored, but this does not necessarily mean that adversaries do 
not possess copies of the key. Likewise, you can try to protect 
the idea/content/expression of the key through legal and 
technological means but this will only be as effective as the 
physical and network security of access. I will return to these 
problems of property and knowledge in the next chapter.
The era of asymmetric encryption and passwords is part 
of a broader move towards a science and mathematics of 
passwords. Without the fundamental theoretical mathematical 
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work and then computer-scientific implementation of those 
algorithms, these mechanisms for authentication would 
not be possible. As I indicated at the start of this chapter, 
however, in many cases we use metaphors to think about the 
outputs of technologies that do not really have direct physical 
analogies. The implications for the philosophy of passwords 
extends into metaphors of memory, property, knowledge, 
space and ownership and this is seen nowhere so clearly as in 
asymmetric key-based encryption.
Biometrics
The most recent development in the realm of passwords 
at the time of writing pertains to the use of biometrics for 
authentication. This can be seen in the fact that several 
technological media outlets have published approving, but 
I would suggest pre-emptive, articles framing a ‘plot to kill the 
password’ through biometrics.14 As the term implies, biometrics 
refer to the measurement (metrics) of organic matter (bio). The 
rationale behind these technologies is that we might dispense 
with using knowledge or possession as proxies for identity and 
skip directly to measure a person’s unique genetic constitution 
(with identical twins being the exception) and its expression in 
physical features (such as fingerprints, retina, iris, face, voice). 
As usual, though, this is hardly straightforward.
One of the most widely cited works on biometrics suggests 
that there are seven core elements to which the designer of 
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a biometric system must attend: universality, uniqueness, 
permanence, collectability, performance, acceptability and 
circumvention.15 Universality refers to the fact that all users 
of a biometric system must have the biological elements to be 
measured. If it is possible that users do not have hands, eyes 
or other body parts, then a system that measures these will 
be insufficient. Uniqueness is the condition of specificity; the 
aspect to be measured must be different from all other people. 
Permanence refers to the fact that people’s biological elements 
change over time; a biometric system requires a relatively 
stable item to measure. Collectability means that the item to be 
measured must be capable of being collected with proportionate 
ease. Performance refers to how well the system is able to use 
biological measurements to determine identity correctly. 
Acceptability refers to the degree of positive social response to 
the idea (whether people baulk at having their eyes scanned, for 
instance). Finally, circumvention is the term used to denote the 
ease with which the system might be compromised.
There are two main uses to which biometrics can be put: 
authentication and identification. Up until this point I have 
treated these two terms as roughly synonymous but there is, 
in fact, a subtle difference between the terms. Authentication 
occurs when a specific individual is matched to a single identity. 
The question asked in settings of authentication is whether a 
person present can produce a matching biological pattern for 
one particular set of information that was previously stored. 
Identification, in the context of biometrics, works slightly 
differently. In a biometric environment, identification means 
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searching a database for the information that correlates to a 
specific individual. In other words, authentication is a one-
to-one process: Does this unique individual before me match 
the information I have on file? By contrast, identification is 
a one-to-many operation: Which of the many records that 
I have on file corresponds to this individual? ‘Is this person 
the right person?’ versus ‘Who is that person?’
Biometric technologies are interesting with respect to the 
asymmetric age of twenty-first-century passwords. In some 
senses, biometric approaches are symmetric. If an attacker 
can find the pattern stored for someone’s iris, for example, 
he or she may be able to create a replica of the eye that will 
fool a scanner. Indeed, the first batch of eye scanners could 
be fooled by holding up a picture of the correct eye while 
early face scanners could likewise be fooled by an image of 
the corresponding face. In this sense, usually due to technical 
defect, biometric implementations seem to be symmetric.
However, at the same time, when implemented correctly, 
biometric technologies are asymmetric. In theory, it shouldn’t 
matter whether you know that my eye will open a door because 
we do not have the ability to create bespoke organic matter. 
This may change, of course, as genetic engineering advances, 
but for now, biometric authentication systems rest upon a 
simple premise. Information, including organic information, 
about an individual may be public and an attacker will still 
not be able to bypass a correctly designed biometric system.
This is not to say that hypothetical, often violent, situations 
have not been envisaged to defeat biometrics, even when 
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the authentication systems are technically sound (i.e.  they 
require a requisite body to be present). These instances of 
body-part removal in order to gain access have primarily 
come from literary and film contexts and are referred to, by 
the well-known Wiki TV Tropes, as a ‘borrowed biometric 
bypass’.16 Dan Brown’s Angels & Demons and Warner Bros.’s 
1993 film Demolition Man, for example, both give instances 
where a psychopathic character removes an authorized user’s 
eyeball in order to defeat biometric iris scanning. In the case 
of Demolition Man, the specific grisly moment occurs upon 
the escape of Simon Phoenix (played by Wesley Snipes) from 
cryogenic prison. Phoenix uses a ballpoint pen to gouge 
out the eye of a prison warden that he then holds up to the 
scanner in order to break free.
Figure 4 Simon Phoenix deploys a grisly borrowed biometric 
bypass in the film Demolition Man. Copyright Warner Bros. 1993. 
Used under fair-dealings provisions.
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With respect to the philosophy of passwords that 
I  have been tracing – noting an equation of knowledge 
or possession with identity – the biometric bypass is of 
particular significance. The fact that body parts might be 
transferable entities has considerable implications for the 
definition of identity and self. Indeed, in these cases, body 
parts become just another transferable item that can defeat 
an authentication system and identity cannot, as such, be 
part of any link to a body. Bodies become conceived of as 
mere property and not integral to identity by evildoers who 
wish to bypass biometric security systems.
Other cinematic works have used borrowed biometric 
bypass tropes in a more metaphorical and nuanced way. 
The  2002 film Minority Report, for instance, weaves a 
complex relationship between knowledge and the body. In 
the world of this film, which is based loosely upon Philip K. 
Dick’s 1956 short story of the same name, murders are seen 
before they occur by three ‘precognitive’ beings, allowing the 
police department to arrest perpetrators before the crime has 
been committed. The plot takes an unusual turn in that the 
chief of police, John Anderton (played in the film by Tom 
Cruise), is predicted to commit a murder about which he 
knows nothing in advance.
As with most films that deal with foresight, one of the key 
themes of the movie is free will; does knowing one’s eventual 
destiny yield the possibility for change? What is perhaps less 
clear to the average viewer, however, is the degree to which 
the body is the key authentication device in the film. One 
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instance of this is obvious. The future world of Minority 
Report is saturated with eye scanners. In one gruesome 
moment, the protagonist has his eyes surgically removed and 
a fresh pair re-inserted so that he can adopt the identity of 
‘Mr. Yamamoto’ and move around the futuristic city without 
being detected. However, Anderton keeps his old eyes in a 
bag so that he can use them to gain access to sensitive areas 
(revealing a fairly gaping hole in the plot: Surely such access 
would have been immediately rescinded?).
More subtly, however, the main narrative of the film 
revolves around the dual thefts of a single body in order to 
gain access to knowledge. It transpires that the man who 
built the system that allows the precrime unit to see into the 
future had to have the mother of one of the ‘precogs’, Agatha, 
murdered. Anne Lively, Agatha’s mother, wanted her child 
back. This was unacceptable since Agatha’s precognitive 
abilities were crucial to the precrime system. In this way, 
Agatha’s body and mind are stolen so that the precrime unit 
can have access to knowledge of the future. As Yari Lanci 
puts it, what emerges ‘is a constant struggle for the monopoly 
over a pre-emptive grasp of the future’.17 This ‘pre-emptive 
grasp of the future’ is precognitive – that is, a mental process 
pertaining to knowledge and thought – but access to it is 
monopolized through control of the body. Agatha’s body 
in the film Minority Report acts as a biometric (organic), 
psychometric (psychological) and psychimetric (psychic) 
access key to the monopoly of the pre-emptive grasp of the 
future.
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The second theft of a body in order to gain access that 
occurs in this film, however, is part of the main narrative. 
After being accused of murder, Anderton wishes to ascertain 
whether he has a ‘minority report’; a rare occurrence in 
which one of the precogs sees a different future to the other 
two. However, the precrime system in Minority Report 
requires protection against false positives (where a crime is 
wrongly forecasted). As one of its inventors in the film notes, 
‘For precrime to function, there can’t be any suggestion 
of fallibility.’ For this reason, these minority reports are 
destroyed and stored, for the record, ‘inside the precog who 
predicted it’.
Anderton therefore undertakes to steal the precog 
Agatha from her nutrition tank, modifying his face via a 
powerful drug so that he can enter the compound and not 
be detected. As he tells her, he must do this because she 
‘contains information’. In a mirror of the fact that Agatha 
was originally stolen from her mother, the nutrition 
tank from which Anderton ‘steals’ her in the film is 
notably shaped like the female reproductive system. Most 
importantly, though, the theft of the body by Anderton 
is to gain access to information; the body allows the 
violation of the mind in this world. Agatha is once more 
reduced to a body that can be used to gain knowledge, an 
item of property to be stolen, in contrast to the intention 
of biometrics to bind agency, personhood and self purely 
to the body.
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Figure 5 The precognitives and their womb-like tank in Minority 
Report. Copyright Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation 2002. 
Used under fair-dealings provisions.
The questions that are raised by biometrics and the ability 
to bypass them are about the nature of human selfhood. 
Passwords in previous eras were concerned with the ways in 
which knowledge might act as a proxy for identity. Proving 
that one had access to pre-shared knowledge in some form was 
the best that could be hoped for in systems of authentication. 
Then, around the 1970s, the mathematicization of passwords 
began to complicate notions of ownership and knowledge. 
The question became one of protecting access to a material 
space (a hard disk, a networked computer system) that could 
potentially be violated by an adversary in order to gain access 
to knowledge stored in a virtual ‘space’: the externalization of 
memory. Finally, the idea was that if knowledge was inadequate 
and if these external sites of storage were also fallible, perhaps 
linking identity directly to someone’s body might work.
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Except it doesn’t. A person’s body may change and yet they 
remain the same person. The borrowed biometric bypass 
trope also demonstrates, at least in horrific theory, that the 
body may be mutilated in order to fool biometric systems. 
On the other hand, someone who suffers brain damage in 
an accident is, again, still the same person. He or she may no 
longer be able to remember information that we might use 
for authentication, but his or her core personhood remains. 
I do not mean, by ‘core personhood’, that there is some kind 
of natural, unchanging essence to a person. People are the 
result of a complex set of interactions between their genetic 
constitution and the environment that surrounds them and 
change over time. Instead, I simply wish to point out that a 
person can recognize another person both as a human and 
as an individual in an intuitive way that seems to defy the 
formalization that we seek in systems of passwords. In other 
words, authentication mechanisms – and particularly those 
that rely on technology – attempt to use a set of proxies 
(knowledge and the body) to identify people. These proxies, 
though, are insufficient. People are neither solely their bodies 
nor just their brains. They are not even simply a combination 
of these aspects. More than in most other phenomena, 
passwords, mathematics and biometrics continue to show us, 
even as secularization marches onwards, that we still seem 
to have no viable definition of a human, of a person. Some 
call this object that we seek and fail to formalize a person’s 
‘essence’. Others use the words ‘personhood’ or ‘self ’. Still 
others call it the soul.
4 iDentitY
It is clear by now that passwords are not simply mechanisms 
of identification and authentication. Instead, in their 
various forms, passwords expose a broader set of problems 
concerned with human identity, knowledge and the body. 
Passwords are also revealed as instruments of exclusion from 
spaces, knowledge and practices, while themselves taking 
these forms. In this final section, we will more thoroughly 
explore the ways in which notions of identity are bound 
up with the problems of passwords. In particular, I want to 
draw attention to the rhetoric of ‘identity theft’, a formulation 
that only became possible with the emergence of a specific 
conception of passwords. Namely, at a certain point in the 
rise of the digital technologies, situated amid the creeping 
rise of a universal language of economy, passwords became 
so seemingly natural that organizations operating with 
sensitive information online – often financial institutions 
– became able to claim that knowing the same thing as 
someone else makes you that other person. In reality, what 
seems to be meant by the phrase ‘identity theft’ is that a 
malefactor is able to use knowledge to illegally take on the 
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societal roles rightfully belonging to someone else, such as 
accessing a bank account or claiming social security benefits. 
The discourse of identity theft is only possible, therefore, in 
a world where a person’s ‘identity’ is conceived as little more 
than the sum of his or her functions in society, functions 
to which an individual has access only because he or she is 
supposed to uniquely know certain things. This is the bold 
assertion that sits behind the words ‘identity theft’.
‘theft’ in a non-rivalrous world
In Chapter 2 we saw, through various forms of literature, 
how passwords need the quality of exclusion. If more 
people know the password than are supposed to, then the 
system has been defeated. At the same time, however, we 
also discussed the fact that passwords often take the form 
of knowledge. As above, knowledge is a non-rivalrous object 
form, meaning that it can be copied indefinitely without the 
originator losing access. In order to consider what it might 
mean to have one’s identity stolen, then, I suggest that it is 
first imperative to understand what we mean by ‘theft’ in the 
digital age, which involves a little more thinking about the 
nature of knowledge and property.
Resuming the discussion begun in Chapter 3, the artificial 
legal notion of intellectual property has been sustained in 
recent times by rhetorical analogy between unauthorized 
reproduction and theft. There is, though, a crucial distinction 
85iDentitY
between the terms. Theft is the act of dishonestly taking 
someone else’s property and therefore depriving them of 
access to it. In UK law, for instance, it is quite explicit that 
to steal something means the original owner loses access: 
‘A person is guilty of theft if he dishonestly appropriates 
property belonging to another with the intention of 
permanently depriving the other of it.’1 US law varies from 
state to state, but all larceny-theft provisions are divided into 
two components: (1) dishonest appropriation of property; 
(2) with the intent to deprive the original owner of it.
This becomes important in cases where anti-piracy groups 
seek to make an analogy between theft and unauthorized 
distribution of their copyrighted material. For instance, 
the infamous 2005 campaign, ‘Piracy: It’s A Crime’, was 
spearheaded by the Motion Picture Association of America 
and made such a link explicit. ‘You wouldn’t steal a car,’ the 
announcement began, before continuing, ‘You wouldn’t steal 
a handbag / You wouldn’t steal a television / You wouldn’t 
steal a movie / Downloading pirated films is stealing /Stealing 
is against the law.’ And yet, by the laws of most countries, 
copyright violation is a civil, not criminal, offence and it is 
certainly not stealing. Importantly for the point that I am 
making here about passwords, by downloading a pirated 
film, one does not deprive an original owner of property. 
It is true that these acts of ‘piracy’ might make it harder for 
the copyright holder to profit from the work in future, but 
this incalculable future speculation is difficult to include 
in consideration of present property under theft statutes. 
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Downloading is an act of copying in which a new party gains 
access to something even while the original owner continues 
to have that same object.
Indeed, it is difficult to think about theft in a digital 
world, even when it comes to money. In previous eras, when 
money was a physical item such as a banknote or coin, the 
only ways to obtain more money illegally were to either 
fraudulently forge a copy of these items or to steal somebody 
else’s coinage. In the digital age, things are different. ‘Money’ 
is often simply a numerical representation, stored within a 
computer system. This has led some to note that the legalistic 
definition of theft is perhaps out of step with the needs of 
a digital world of infinite reproduction. Jaron Lanier, for 
example, uses this aspect of digital currency to argue that if 
we believe that downloading is not ‘theft’, because it doesn’t 
deprive a specific other of property, then the same might 
be said for someone who ‘hacked into a bank account and 
just added money’. This is confused metaphorical thinking, 
though. Lanier is right that what a criminal would have 
violated here is the law of the ‘artificial scarcities that allow 
the economy to function’.2 What is wrong is to turn this back 
into theft. It is, instead, directly analogous to minting one’s 
own new currency fraudulently, in contravention to the 
social and legal contracts that forbid this: theft versus fraud.
Passwords (in line with all other digital and knowledge 
‘objects’) are not like physical property. Knowledge cannot be 
stolen. It can be taken and copied without permission but this 
is not theft in any legalistic sense. Why, then, does the term 
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‘identity theft’ so clearly begin to outperform the alternative 
formulation, ‘identity fraud’, from the late 1990s onwards? 
Clearly, an identity cannot be stolen, in the true sense, any 
more than the proxies that we use to denote it (a password). 
Indeed, ‘identity fraud’ is a much better term. ‘Unauthorised 
access’ would be even more accurate. But it is identity theft 
that has become the term that is used. Why?
identifying risk
I contend that the reason that the term ‘identity theft’ is 
favoured over any of the alternatives is that it absolves 
institutions in the digital world of responsibility for the 
inherent flaws in their authentication systems. In turn, by 
displacing risk, these institutions are able to offer convenience 
to their customers as a trade-off against security. The way 
Figure 6 The rise of ‘identity theft’ as the preferred term to 
denote the circumvention of password mechanisms as seen in 
the Google Books corpus, 1994–2008.3 Used by permission of 
Google: https://books.google.com/ngrams/info.
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in which this displacement of risk works can be seen in a 
systematic analysis of the different phrases that we might use 
to describe such forms. Throughout the following analysis it 
is important to remember that online authentication systems 
are standing in as long-range systems that are supposed 
to fulfil a social function: to establish trust on the basis of 
identity. That they have weaknesses should not be used as an 
excuse simply to avoid the difficult questions of blame, risk 
and fault when these weaknesses are exposed. At the same 
time, however, as consumers we often want the convenience 
of long-range access while also wanting security, two aspects 
that are usually pitted in trade-off against each other. 
Passwords and the online systems that surround them are 
so common to us that we now tend to think of them as 
natural, as though they are the only and best solution to the 
problem of identification. This is dangerous, though, since 
we can end up with a situation where the password systems 
that we have are deemed perfect and it must be people who 
are to blame – and particularly the person who is to be 
identified – when they are circumvented. Before proceeding, 
I do want to note upfront that in the case of financial 
institutions, which feature as my primary examples in the 
following section, a bank will usually refund your money 
and take the risk themselves (sometimes for public relations 
reasons, sometimes due to regulation), even while using 
the term ‘identity theft’. I contend, though, that this might 
change in the future with the normalization of the idea of 
identity theft as a linguistically valid concept.
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If, then, the phrase used was ‘unauthorised access’, the 
immediate question becomes: Who gave authorization and 
how is this different from authentication? In the scenario 
of someone hacking into my bank account, for example, it 
is clear that I have not authorized the user to perform any 
actions on my account. As a general rule, I tend to restrict 
the right to redistribute my own money to myself. And yet, 
probably through some compromise of my password, in this 
hypothetical situation a user has managed to persuade the 
bank’s authentication system that he or she is me. In turn, 
this technological mechanism may then authorize the hacker 
to undertake actions on the assumption that it is I who is 
acting. In this scenario, the phrasing implies that something 
has gone severely wrong in the institution’s process. I did 
not give authorization and so am not to blame. The bank’s 
authentication system was not good enough to distinguish 
between me and an attacker and so made an error. From 
this error of authentication, the system (and by implication 
the bank) made an additional error in then authorizing this 
user to take actions that I have not in any way sanctioned. 
From the perspective of a financial institution, ‘unauthorised 
access’ is about the worst of the list as it makes the error 
almost entirely that of the bank.
Conversely, if the phrase ‘identity fraud’ is used, then the 
role of an institution becomes slightly different. While still 
having made a mistake in identifying a person, institutions 
here become victims. The error, in other words, is neither 
the fault of the end-user nor entirely of the bank. Indeed, 
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the phrase ‘identity fraud’ quite clearly places the blame 
upon the act of duplicitous impersonation. While there are 
steps to be taken against being defrauded, this is certainly 
more favourable to institutions whose compromise might 
involve financial loss since it implies that they should be less 
liable for the outcome. On the other hand, though, cyber-
criminals are notoriously hard to track down and so it is very 
hard to summon a real, concrete figure to blame. The other 
interesting mutation that has occurred around this term, 
though, is the frequent claim that it is end-users who are the 
victims of fraud and not the bank.
This is, itself, curious. One would expect this when 
the term ‘identity theft’ is used; after all, the victim of the 
theft is the person losing the stolen ‘object’. Why, though, 
have those impersonated been cast as victims of fraud in 
this discourse? Turning once more to legal definitions, 
fraud by false representation occurs when someone has 
‘made a false representation, dishonestly, knowing that 
the representation was or might be untrue or misleading, 
with intent to make a gain for himself or another, to cause 
loss to another or to expose another to risk of loss’.4 Yet 
to whom has the false representation been made in the 
example scenario that I have been using? It is certainly not 
the user who is being impersonated. It is, indeed, extremely 
unlikely that I would fall for a scam in which somebody 
falsely claimed to be me. Identity fraud can, logically, only 
have a victim who is someone other than the person being 
impersonated! Instead, continuing the banking example, it is 
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the financial institution’s authentication mechanism that has 
been tricked. And yet, for many years now the discourse of 
identity fraud has been mutating towards one that attempts 
to make the person impersonated the victim. Certainly, the 
person impersonated may suffer as a consequence, but it is 
important to note that he or she is not the party who made 
the misidentification.
The re-situation of blame in online password structures 
towards a system where it is users, not institutions, who are 
at fault, finds its highest form in the term ‘identity theft’. 
The discourse of ‘digital hygiene’ (which refers to regularly 
changing passwords, running anti-virus software, etc.) has 
it that, as with poorly secured items in the physical world, 
users should take personal responsibility for their identity 
or property.5 Indeed, most insurance policies for theft in the 
‘real world’ require that the policyholder implement a set 
of precautions to protect the property themselves and any 
lapse may invalidate a claim, thereby recentring blame on the 
individual. The same goes for passwords in the rhetoric of 
identity theft. Rather than conceive of password systems as 
flawed and weak, most banks have clauses that protect them 
from litigation if the user takes insufficient steps to protect 
the pre-shared knowledge. Although this formulation of 
‘identity theft’ is technically nonsensical, then, as I have 
already pointed out above it is also attractive for institutions. 
If the general public can be made to believe that the inherent 
weaknesses in passwords are not actually flaws but it is rather 
that their identities have been stolen (because they practised 
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poor digital hygiene), then this softens the way for banks 
and other authentication providers to change their liability 
provisions at a later stage.
The fundamental appeal of the logic of identity theft lies 
in its direct analogy to physical property. Relatively few 
people can understand the technological workings that sit 
behind complex systems of authentication. By representing 
technology through metaphors of the physical world (i.e. by 
making it seem that the technology is a transparent translator 
of the physical), it is more likely that existing thinking will 
be applied to the technology. In doing this, authentication 
providers hope to re-apply existing legal logics in the virtual 
space. But the virtual realm does not behave entirely like the 
physical world and the conflation that is sought is multiple: 
physical property should be thought of as analogous to 
knowledge which in turn should be considered analogous 
to identity. The core shift in thinking that this flattening 
logic entails is that, in the digital age, what you know is to 
be considered as who you are. Knowledge and identity are 
inseparable.
knowledge/identity
In the past thirty years of thought in the academic 
humanities, few formulations have been so widespread 
as Michel Foucault’s notion of Power/Knowledge. Most 
clearly articulated in Discipline and Punish but furthered in 
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his History of Sexuality, the notion of Power/Knowledge is 
not the same as the clichéd formulation that ‘knowledge is 
power’. It is instead an observation that power is based upon 
monopolizing the right to specify how truth and knowledge 
are understood. Foucault uses the example of the religious 
confession as an example of this. In a confession, the penitent 
is told (power) to produce statements of truth (knowledge) 
about his or her forbidden desires. This then forms a 
feedback loop as the knowledge that is produced empowers 
the confessor to absolve the penitent of sins.6 In Foucault’s 
history, aspects of confession leaked into psychiatric 
practice during various phases of secularization. In this way, 
psychiatry employed (and in Foucault’s reading, continues 
to employ) the power of confessional truth speaking to 
produce various forms of subject identity that must then 
be controlled.7 The other core example of this is the power 
now bestowed upon scientific practice. While it may seem 
incontrovertible that science aims towards truth, such a 
statement was not accepted throughout human history. In 
previous eras there was no empirical science, as we know 
it. At some core point in our recent history, however, the 
discourse of experimental repetition and intersubjective 
validation (‘science’) became the primary custodian of 
truth (with just cause; its advances are admirable). Often, as 
Umberto Eco points out, this emergence of empirical science 
was contentious and could not be understood as truth 
because it conflicted with other forms of stronger social truth 
and meaning, such as the Bible.8 Thinking about science in 
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this way does, though, empower a type of truth-producing 
practice (discourse) that is not universal and absolute, but 
historical and relative. More importantly, it is not that power 
and knowledge are identical but rather that they demonstrate 
interchangeability, a close co-dependency.
Passwords interact with this truth/knowledge problem 
because they are technologies of power that produce identity 
through knowledge and bodies. They are technologies because 
they are the formalized and routinized tools and implements 
through which we exclude. They are technologies of power 
because they are used to regulate and control access. They 
produce identity because, in the moment of utterance or 
performance of a password, an individual classifies himself or 
herself in the eyes of another, usually into a predefined set of 
identity formations. They do so through knowledge and bodies 
because they rely on pre-shared secrets (or asymmetric key 
knowledge) in the majority of cases or supposedly unique 
bodily presence in the minority.
In one way of thinking, the identity constructions that 
passwords allow are actually limited to a predefined set 
that is circular. The knowledge and bodies that passwords 
use as their proxy for an unformalized idea of personhood 
are supposed to verify that a specific subject is the bearer 
of the knowledge or the owner of the body, treating this as 
definition of personhood. In other words, this traditional 
way of thinking about passwords as identity means just 
that: a body that is presented for inspection is identical to 
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a predefined body or knowledge spoken in response to a 
challenge is identical to pre-shared knowledge.
A second way of seeing this, however, ties the password 
to its function. In this paradigm, passwords do not identify 
people, but rather use knowledge and bodies to classify 
people into groups that serve a practical purpose. This is 
more akin to a system of classification such as ‘allowed 
in’ versus ‘access denied’. Once more, though, this way of 
thinking is not well suited for displacing risk. Since, in this 
paradigm, passwords have nothing to do with an individual’s 
identity, the burden of responsibility for misclassification is 
placed upon the classifier.
The broader philosophical stance of passwords as 
classification systems sits within various histories of thought 
and there are certainly many thinkers who have considered 
the logical relationship between an item and its taxonomy. 
Set theory, in mathematics, is one of the foremost examples 
of areas where this might be interesting. The other, though, is 
a formulation of classification that defies total encapsulation. 
For Theodor W. Adorno, for example, it is the case that 
‘objects do not go into their concepts without leaving a 
remainder’.9 No process of classification is ever sufficient to 
capture human life. The identity that we might derive from a 
system of passwords is not identical to a person and cannot 
be so. In a very different context and as an unlikely co-holder 
of such a view, Jaron Lanier sees a similar phenomenon in 
the realm of social media, where the design decisions of 
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software engineering tend to reduce our notion of people to 
pre-filled categories. For instance, Lanier asserts, 
The binary character at the core of software engineering 
tends to reappear at higher levels. It is far easier to tell a 
program to run or not to run, for instance, than it is to 
tell it to sort-of run. In the same way, it is easier to set up 
a rigid representation of human relationships on digital 
networks: on a typical social networking site, either you 
are designated to be in a couple or you are single (or you 
are in one of a few other predetermined states of being) 
– and that reduction of life is what gets broadcast between 
friends all the time.10
This problem is not, as Lanier states from his computational-
centric worldview, unique to software. For centuries we have 
classified people using terms that are less than the sum of 
their whole. It is a quintessentially human thing to do.
The point is not then that passwords, particularly in 
the digital age, are somehow reductionist-classifying 
instruments. On their own, passwords do not contribute to 
the problems of classification outlined by Adorno and, in 
a different way, Lanier. It is, rather, that passwords require 
an interaction with such classifications to be of any use. 
Indeed, when I wrote that passwords ‘produce identity’, the 
missing question is: Identity with what? The answer cannot 
be discerned in a password itself as an abstraction, but only 
within the contexts of exclusion that these words of power 
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enable. As it was at one point for the philosopher Ludwig 
Wittgenstein with language, so it is with passwords and 
society: ‘The use of the word in practice is its meaning.’11 
Without thinking about what passwords do, what they are 
for and how we use them, we are able to say very little about 
their history and continued existence, their meaning.
••••_
Passwords have appeared throughout human history in a 
variety of forms. While we most commonly conceive of 
passwords as instruments to verify who somebody is, it is 
my contention that they are in fact classification technologies 
that make no sense without an exclusionary context within 
which to operate. Passwords do not, in such thinking, verify 
somebody’s identity. How could they? As I attempted to 
show in the preceding chapters on biometrics and identity, 
it is very hard to formalize a description of a person. People 
are not solely their bodies or their minds and, as humans, 
we intuitively recognize this. Machines or those without 
prior knowledge of an individual, however, cannot take that 
intuitive step for recognition and require a formal system’s 
description language for human identity. To fulfil this need 
for formal descriptions, we can establish a series of proxy 
measures – passwords, biometrics, mathematical hashes 
– that can function as a loosely coupled approximation 
of a person’s identity. However, passwords in all of their 
incarnations are never more than an approximation for 
identity. They represent an elision of the fact that we don’t 
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know how to describe a person fully and flawlessly to a 
machine or to someone with no prior knowledge of that 
individual.
We often forget this fact when we talk about passwords 
and the instances when they are compromised. This is how 
the rhetoric of identity theft can be possible and it is the 
reason why the argument that I am making here is more 
than a simple matter of semantics. When using the term 
‘identity theft’, the password system has been considered 
to depict a total description of a person. It is this kind of 
thinking that can lead to absurd pronouncements, such as 
that in Business Insider recently where it was proclaimed that 
going through a ‘major life event’, such as getting married, 
put you at ‘a higher risk of identity theft’. Feminist arguments 
about patriarchal cultures of marriage might agree with this, 
for different reasons. More seriously, though, it is on this 
basis that business consultants seek to shift the conversation 
to one of personal responsibility for the protection of 
identity (by which they mean passwords – a form of non-
rivalrous knowledge), as though it were physical property. 
This manifests in claims that ‘people need to take active 
ownership in protecting themselves’ when, in fact, those 
verifying identity need to take better care in the design of 
their systems and responsibility for the weaknesses of the 
proxy measures that they choose.12 In discourses of identity 
theft, passwords have become a full description of a person 
that, when stolen, dangerously change what you know into 
who you are.
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At the same time, it is quite clear that passwords are 
inadequate measures for identifying people. The increasing 
frequency with which high-profile breaches are reported 
is a certain indicator of this fact. This aspect of passwords 
has, I contend, been known for many centuries and is most 
specifically seen in early literary representations. In ancient 
cultures of magic, such as the Assyrian and Egyptian rites 
of the dead, the words given to enter the underworld space 
were not actually concerned with identity at all; they were 
rather concerned with privilege. Those who could afford 
to have the words of entrance painted upon their funerary 
vessels would have the knowledge to cross into paradise. 
Not individual identification, then, but class distinction 
made on the grounds of worldly capital. For the Egyptians 
in particular here, the spells of class identification are meant 
to ensure an afterlife where only the materially virtuous 
(i.e.  those who had inherited or come into wealth) would 
reach post-mortem safety.
Likewise, as covered above in my chapter on passwords in 
literature, tales such as Ali Baba are based around defeating 
passwords. The very fact that passwords cannot stand in for 
identity is what makes the narrative action of such a story 
possible. This is even present in the title of that tale; the 
‘forty thieves’ are a class, a literary archetype of colluding 
malefactors and the password does not substitute for a single 
person. It is rather supposed to allow entrance for villains 
and deny access to protagonists, inverted over the course of 
the tale’s narrative. Ali Baba can be read, in fact, as a warning 
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of the disjunct between identity and its representation in 
passwords. The fact that the tale closes with Ali Baba as 
the sole possessor of the knowledge to enter the cave looks, 
superficially, as though order has been restored. Passwords 
are once more confined to individual identification. The 
preceding narrative, however, should warn us that the tale 
views identity and its proxies in a more complex light and 
that the narrative is, in this way, cyclical. The text seems to 
signal beyond its final page towards a day when Ali Baba will 
find himself usurped, made possible by his own overly strong 
faith in the technology of passwords.
The magic of the world of the Harry Potter books is 
also interesting in this respect. Unwilling to codify magic 
in such a way that anyone can perform it with a wand and 
the prerequisite knowledge, J. K. Rowling has, here, to fall 
back on a far older literary tradition: pure identification. 
It is not enough, in her fictional universe, to know and to 
have, the most common proxies that we use for granting 
or forbidding access. Instead, because her books deploy 
magic, she can insist that there is a predetermined class of 
people, wizards, who can do magic simply because of who 
they are. In Rowling’s literary scenario, the measures that 
we usually want to stand in for identity (knowledge, bodies 
and possession of things), are mostly outshone by the notion 
that somebody just might be someone for no reason and with 
no proxy. It appears, superficially, as though you are either a 
wizard or you are not. Yet Rowling further complicates this 
idea through her presentation of ‘squibs’; people of magical 
101iDentitY
descent, in possession of a wand, with knowledge of spells 
but still unable to perform magic to any high standard. 
Rowling’s use of ‘squibs’ signals her own knowledge that all 
of these proxies remain inadequate. Even genetic descent, 
in Rowling’s world, is complicated as a measure of whether 
someone will be allowed access to the practice of magic.
This prodding at the foundation of identity is continued in 
various cinematic contexts. As I have shown from just a few 
examples, contemporary cinema has frequently undermined 
passwords as core narrative devices. In such varied contexts 
as Demolition Man, Angels & Demons, Die Another Day, 
Alien: Resurrection, The Avengers and Minority Report we see 
instances where supposedly infallible biometric password 
devices are subverted by the mutability (and mutilation) of 
the body. The way in which such films often present their 
degrading of passwords is through a body-mind split. 
In  Minority Report, for example, as shown in a previous 
chapter, there is a link, but also a distinction, between the 
body and the mind. The protagonist wants access to the 
precognitive’s mind but can only do so by stealing her body, 
thereby mirroring the master narrative of the film and 
repeating a cycle whereby individuals are praised only for 
their body, their mind or other characteristics, none of which 
can ever fully substitute for identity.
The other history that I charted was the fact that these 
problems of identity have often been most fully explored in 
military contexts. Those areas where there is potential for 
mass destruction have been among the pioneers in designing 
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systems to verify who should be given this power. Persistent 
anxieties remain, however. Since the mathematicization of 
passwords in the 1970s through the development of one-way 
hashing algorithms, we have become increasingly reliant 
on technological mechanisms for which we do not possess 
full formal mathematical proof of soundness. As holes are 
eventually punched in the efficacy of existing algorithms, we 
depend upon the evolution of new methods at a pace that 
will outstrip the capacity of mathematicians to break them 
and of machines to brute-force crack them. It would take 
only one small breakthrough in contemporary mathematical 
theory to render our systems of secure communications 
and authentication (passwords) unusable. This would be 
catastrophic for the globalized practices of the World Wide 
Web that rely on remote identity verification. In the era of the 
atomic bomb, it could be even more devastating if linked to 
various command protocols for our weapons of annihilation.
It seems that, with the concomitant advancement in 
our technological capacity, we have expected passwords to 
become ever more flawless and congruent with some kind 
of pure identity for an individual. If anything, however, this 
is a dangerously naïve view. Should we discover ways of 
breaking the complex mathematical processes that currently 
underpin most of our passwords, the digital era of high 
personal and state security would rapidly unravel. Certainly, 
new biometric technologies will emerge but these will also 
come at a price, usually of personal privacy. The question 
that becomes interesting for ‘identity theft’ in that evolved 
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world is whether, when somebody intercepts your genetic 
codes, they really are any closer to your identity than when 
they merely had knowledge.
Passwords may be inconvenient. They remain, however, 
the most commonly accepted way to determine the bounds 
of exclusion at a distance. Many of us interact with passwords 
multiple times per hour. As a ubiquitous technology, it is easy 
for us to think of passwords as a natural and obvious solution. 
In such a way, passwords as objects socially determine how 
we think, as I have attempted to demonstrate with the 
elisions inherent in the thinking around ‘identity theft’. In 
another sense, though, passwords are only as useful as the 
needs that they serve. It is unlikely that the need to decide 
upon categories of inclusion/exclusion will vanish in the 
near future. How much closer we can get to a formalization 
of a person for the purposes of identity, either genetically 
or otherwise, remains to be seen. In the meantime, we will 
continue to entrust our finances, our national security and 
our privacy to the flawed, memorable phrases that we have 
developed over many centuries: passwords.
••••_
But what might the future of the password hold? Have we 
reached the final frontier for identifying and codifying 
individuals? Hardly. As we speak, smartphone manufacturers 
are working on an ‘unlock’ mechanism for their devices that 
will determine ‘identity’ through gait using motion sensors. 
It seems certain that as functional MRI techniques progress, 
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unique brain-wave imaging/patterning will at some point 
enter the identification equation. Likewise, facial recognition 
marches on apace. Closer to the present, some outfits, such 
as Yahoo, are already replacing all passwords with one-time 
tokens, sent to a device that a user owns. Perhaps at some 
time we will see the introduction of immediate genetic 
sequencing that will allow extremely fast comparison of an 
individual’s DNA to a copy held on file, a prospect that may 
terrify some privacy campaigners. At the same time, who can 
tell how quickly genetic engineering may advance and what 
measures people might take to modify their own genetic 
constitution in order to defeat such biometric systems of the 
future?
Can we conceive, though, of a day when ‘Halt who goes 
there?’ will not be understood? Certainly Hamlet’s speech 
pattern of ‘unfold yourself ’ is no longer contemporary 
parlance, which is a shame, but we recognize the formulation 
of a password structure in the play so strongly that this is 
unproblematic. Might the time come, though, when an 
audience would not? Is it possible that our strongest means of 
tying identity to knowledge, property and the body could be 
deemed by the future to be so hopelessly naive and vulnerable 
that they would be a laughable concept? Alternatively, 
could notions of privacy be so radically transformed in a 
future society that there would be no need of structures like 
passwords because the inclusion/exclusion paradigm itself 
will have melted into air? There are both strains of utopian 
and dystopian thought that propose such futures, although 
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a world without privacy probably most clearly summons 
George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four [1949] to mind.
Continuing in this speculative vein, we might finally 
arrive at some of the stranger logical conclusions of thinking 
about passwords. If the ultimate system of passwords 
were one that had no proxies – a mode in which identity 
really did mean checking one person against another, 
identical individual – then the best password would be 
one in which people were cloned. In science/speculative 
fictional environments such as the world of Star Trek, 
such technology exists. The transporter devices in that 
fictional universe convert people into an ‘energy pattern’ 
that is then reconstructed into the same person at the target 
site. The energy pattern, in other words, must contain a 
perfect representation of the original human being for the 
re-materialization to work. In the film The Prestige [2006] 
this notion of duplication and teleportation is even more 
tightly coupled to identity as the plot twist (in which one of 
the cloned individuals must be killed each time) is mirrored 
in an identical twin scenario. In these fictions we see the 
seeds of perfect formalization of individuals that could lead 
to precise verification of identity, the most accomplished 
system of passwords possible. Is such a mode desirable? 
What are the ethical dilemmas behind such formalization? 
These questions and many more circle around the notions 
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